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I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
A. Turning a Constellation of Dots into an Understandable Matrix
Although it was three decades ago, I still remember the insecurity as-
sociated with preparing my first several Federal Rules of Evidence classes.
It was painfully obvious that while teaching the individual rules would be
tough enough, teaching anything that approached a meaningful apprecia-
tion for the overarching philosophy, application, and interrelationship of
those rules would be problematic at best.2 I was concerned that this limita-
tion might compromise the value of my first classes, maybe even the entire
course. Fortunately, those worries were significantly reduced by exper-
ienced colleagues who provided tremendous background information and
invaluable practical teaching assistance.3 Their thoughts have remained
with me over the years and eventually helped create the "portraits and
mosaics regime" to the Federal Rules of Evidence which is the subject of
this article.
The regime and this article were constructed to accomplish five things.
First, for professors new to teaching evidence, the regime is a macro level
philosophical and practical overview of the statute. It introduces the Rules'
most significant evidentiary concepts and how they interrelate. Second, the
article can be used as a teaching outline for a new evidence professor's first
several classes. To aid in this process, the article includes references to the
underlying authority and rationale for each rule and principle presented.
This information will help provide the background and resultant confi-
dence necessary for teaching those first few sessions. Third, it is a helpful
road map for beginning evidence students. It allows them to more quickly
and more efficiently understand their evidence course as it unfolds.
Fourth, for those of us who have been teaching evidence for a while, the
article may provide a new thought or two on the Rules that can be incorpo-
rated into existing notes. Fifth, the portraits and mosaics regime can be a
helpful tool in managing classroom time. As discussed throughout the arti-
cle, evidence law has become increasingly complex over the past several
decades. Amendments to the Rules caused by Supreme Court cases have
made the time necessary to teach traditional subjects more precious.'
2. The logical place to begin gaining an appreciation for these topics resides in Edward H.
Cleary, Primlinary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REVIEW 908 (1978). Professor
Cleary was the reporter for the Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence. His
original insights and interpretations remain a wonderful read today.
3. After so many years it is a pleasure to thank Paul Giannelli. Albert J. Westerhead III and
Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Wallace and
Beverly Woodbury University Professor, George Washington University Law School; David A. Schlue-
ter, Hardy Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; and Michael H. Graham, Professor
of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
4. Two leading examples of evidence's increasing complexity and the resultant additional class-
room time required to thoroughly teach complex areas of the Federal Rules of Evidence reside in the
amendments to Rule 702, caused by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (reformulating
the standards for admitting expert opinion testimony and scientific evidence), and the recalculation of
constitutional standards applicable to Article VIII evidence in criminal cases caused by Crawford v.
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1. Transition from the Common Law of Evidence to the Federal Rules
of Evidence
The portraits and mosaics regime is a product of the 1970s, a period
that marked transition from the common law of evidence to the Federal
Rules of Evidence.' Having tried cases in both systems, the pedagogical
advantages of the new rules were unmistakable. They illuminated a pat-
tern or process for trying cases and for teaching evidence that was not read-
ily apparent under the common law.
Codification made the rules of evidence a visible and relatively concise
universe of individual "portraits" which addressed specific substantive or
procedural issues.6 Taken a step further, codification provided a vehicle for
teaching how the individual portraits could be linked to create "mosaics"
which identified those related major substantive and procedural rules of
evidence necessary for a comprehensive understanding and application. Al-
though the portraits and mosaics existed at common law, the ability to
identify and teach them was not as clear and would not have been as effec-
tive. Codification overcame those limitations.
For example, applying the portraits and mosaics regime to hearsay al-
lows us to teach not only hearsay's definition,' the reasons for excluding
hearsay,' and the exceptions or exemptions to the hearsay prohibition,' but
also how and when to procedurally raise hearsay issues, 10 the conse-
quences of failing to adequately or timely raise a hearsay issue," the tacti-
cal considerations surrounding limiting instructions,1 2 how hearsay might
be affected by related issues such as best evidence or authentication re-
quirements,1 4 and how to determine whether otherwise admissible hearsay
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and its progeny (abandoning the 25 year-old standard for admitting
hearsay evidence contained in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
5. For an excellent discussion of moving from the common law of evidence to the codification of
evidence see Robert H. Aronson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Model for Improved Evidentiary
Decisionmaking in Washington, 54 WASH. L. REv. 31 (1978).
6. This process has been incorporated into states' evidence codes as well. See Justice David M.
Borden, The New Code of Evidence: A (Very) Brief Introduction and Overview, 73 CONN. B.J. 210
(1999) (letter and spirit of the Connecticut evidence code parallels the Federal Rules of Evidence).
7. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). (b), and (c). Definitions.
8. FED. R. EVID. 802. Hearsay Rule.
9. See FED. R. EviD. 801(d), 803, 804, and 807.
10. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) (objections to evidence); FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2) (offers of
proof).
11. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (waiver without a timely objection); FED. R. EVID. 103(d) (plain
error).
12. See FED. R. EvID.105 (requirement to request or be deemed to have waived).
13. See FED. R. Evio. Art. X; Mark D. Robins, Evidence at the Electronic Frontier: Introducing
E-mail at Trial in Commercial Litigation, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 219, 245-46 (2003)
(discussing that controversy occasionally arises under the best evidence rule when neither an original
nor a duplicate is available and the proponent seeks to introduce other secondary evidence of the
contents of the document, although courts in the past have not allowed witnesses to testify regarding
their observations about the destroyed document or record).
14. See FED. R. EVID. Art. IX; Paul C. Giannelli, Chain of Custody and the Handling of Real
Evidence, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 527 (1983) (discussing the techniques for establishing a historical con-
nection between an item of real evidence and the events in question).
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should nevertheless be excluded because its trial use might do more harm
to the fact-finding process than could be justified."
Over the past 30 years, the regime has been taught to law students,
practitioners and judges. During a semester as a Fulbright Scholar on the
Nis Faculty of Law, Nis, Serbia, and under similar circumstances for ABA-
CEELI in Moldova as a member of the Balti Faculty of Law, Balti,
Moldova, it was an important part of explaining the American common law
legal system.16 In every context, application of the portraits and mosaics
regime provided insight and understanding about trying cases that would
not otherwise have been possible.
The regime can be adjusted to fit any teaching or litigation purpose."
It can be focused on a specific aspect of evidence practice or tailored to
meet the needs of a distinct audience.s Set out below is the version used
to introduce and teach my traditional, four-hour evidence course.1 9 Gener-
ally, the first two or three class meetings involve introducing the regime
and discussing how it will be used throughout the semester and ultimately
into practice.
2. Connecting the Federal Rules of Evidence to First Year Courses
During our first meeting students are asked: "What role should a code
of evidence play in modern litigation?" 2 0 We eventually come to five re-
sults. First, an omnibus reason: the Federal Rules of Evidence facilitate
15. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if it is "unfairly prejudicial");
Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220 (1976) (classic read
on the judicial administration of trial processes designed to produce accurate decisions).
16. See Lee D. Schinasi, Globalizing: Clinical Legal Education: Successful Under-Developed
Country Experiences," 6 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 129 (2003) (discussing the challenges
and rewards of teaching American substantive law in a former communist civil law legal system).
17. The regime can also be used to support many other techniques evidence professors use in-
cluding case analysis, application of the rules through problem-solving, simulations involving posing,
opposing, or resolving objections, and various combinations of these methods. See Calvin William
Sharpe, Evidence Teaching Wisdom: A Survey, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569, 569 (2003). It can be used
to support professors who teach the rules by using demonstrative evidentiary techniques, or those who
use their own personal "war stories" to illustrate how the rules actually work inside the courtroom. See
Paul Bergman, Teaching Evidence the "Reel" Way, 21 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 973, 975 (2003); Michael L.
Seigel, The Effective Use of War Stories in Teaching Evidence, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1191, 1194 (2006).
The regime also plays a role in establishing evidentiary foundations as Professor Imwinkelreid's series
of treatises on that topic demonstrates. See, e.g., LEE D. SCHINASI, MICHAEL H. GRAHAM & EDWARD
J. IMWINKELREID, FLORIDA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS (3d ed. 2001). Similarly, Professor
Saltzburg's Trial Book series focuses on establishing the combination of rules necessary for admitting
virtually any piece of evidence. See, e.g., LEE D. SCHINASI, GERALD KOGAN, MARGRET STEINBECK &
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, FLORIDA EVIDENCE TRIAL BOOK (2000).
18. See Paul Rothstein. Teaching Evidence, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 999, 1018 (2006). The regime
allows students to see character and credibility evidence in a broader context helping them understand
how the rules would actually be used at trial.
19. For many years I have used RONALD L. CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EDWARD J.
KIONKA & KRISTINE STRACHAN, EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND
STATUTES (6th ed. 2007).
20. It is important that students early on appreciate the varied and overarching role evidence
plays in all forms of litigation. For instance, the Rules of Evidence can be defined as a guide for
ascertaining the truth. See David D. Blink, Ethics, Evidence, and the Modern Adversary Trial, 19 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5 (2006). The Rules are also "tools that enable lawyers to introduce information
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juries being subjected to only appropriate and helpful proof.2 1 We briefly
discuss the differences between the civil and common law legal systems and
whether the Rules as currently written would be necessary if we tried cases
to only professional judges instead of lay jurors.2 2 Second, evidence is the
vehicle for telling the client's story and attacking the opponent's story. Be-
ing able to simply explain events in some organized, generally chronologi-
cal way is the first challenge and the first accomplishment for most new
trial lawyers.2 3 Third, we discuss the Federal Rules of Evidence's impact
on what is often the tipping point of a trial, who to believe, and which side
is more likely to be telling the truth.24 A well-tried case generally presents
two opposing and even believable views of the same events: was the traffic
light red when defendant went through it and smashed into plaintiff's car as
the complaint alleges, or was the light green as defendant's answer states.
favorable to their client's case while blocking or undercutting their opponent's proof." Id. Moreover,
the role evidence plays can be described as "guarding the jury from the overweening effect of certain
kinds of evidence." See Morris D. Bernstein, Judging Witness Credibility: A Talmudic Perspective, 5
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 4, n.17 (2003) (discussing the importance of the prophylactic function of the
rules of evidence in a jury trial). Evidence can be studied for its impact on the role trial lawyers should
play: "[Tihe lawyer is the client's zealous advocate, and therefore must search for the 'best' evidence
from the client's point of view and present it in the way most likely to advance the client's ends." See
Nancy Amoury Combs, Understanding Kaye Scholer: The Autonomous Citizen, the Managed Subject,
and the Role of the Lawyer, 82 CAL. L. REV. 663, 684 (1994). "If [a lawyer] is not sufficiently zealous,
then the factfinder may not have adequate evidence upon which to base her decision." Id. at 685.
21. See Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic Knowledge
Claims in the Post-Daubert Era, 43 TULSA L. REV. 263, 264 (2007) (Evidence can be defined as the "the
building blocks that contribute to the law's edifice of proof." Professor Cole places evidence in a litiga-
tion context by saying that the law, as a truth-seeking institution, purports to discover the truth and
evidence is the vehicle by which this discovery of proof and conclusions of fact are made).
22. In Jacqueline Ross, Do Rules of Evidence Apply (Only) in the Courtroom? Deceptive Interro-
gation in the United States and Germany, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 443, 444 (2008), Professor Ross
demonstrates how civil law systems are generally unencumbered by a body of evidentiary rules because
they commit fact-finding to mixed panels of lay and professional judges. Id. Such professional panels it
is argued are more likely to properly use certain types of evidence, such as hearsay, without a rule-
created shield. Comparatively. American evidentiary rules are "an artifact of the adversarial process"
which relies on lay juries who are thought to be untrustworthy to evaluate evidence accurately or dis-
passionately. Id. See E. Allan Lind, John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Discovery and Presentation of
Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1973).
23. There is no clear-cut best way for new litigators to organize the events of a case. However,
besides a general chronological time-line, there are three other methods that new litigators may utilize
depending on which one best suits the events of their case. See Ariana R. Levinson, Lawyering Skills,
Principles and Methods Offer Insight as to Best Practices for Arbitration, 60 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 49-51
(2008). One method is historical reconstruction where "the lawyer identifies the determinative event
... then asks, if the lawyer's theory of the case is correct, what would likely have happened before the
determinative event, during the determinative event, and after the determinative event." Id. at 49.
Another method is thinking explicitly about inference chains. Id. at 50. This involves first identifying
"a key conclusion that the lawyer hopes to convey to the decision-maker." followed by identifying "a
key piece of circumstantial evidence that would or does (depending on whether it has already been
discovered) support the conclusion," and then finally identifying "the inferences that lead from the
evidence to the conclusion." Id. at 50. A third method is framing the argument as an improbability. Id.
at 51. Also known as the "If _, Would Not - Because _" method, it involves first identifying "a
fact, then a second fact in conflict with the first fact, and then the reason the second fact conflicts with
the first." Id.
24. Before we delve into the character and credibility rules, it is important to weave Professor
Wigmore's often cited guidance into class conversation: [cross-examination is the] "greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth" See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149. 158 (1970) (quoting 5
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367. at 32 (Chadbourn rev. 1974)).
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Did the prosecutrix consent to sex with the accused as he alleges, or was
she forced into sex as the indictment states? 25 We then discuss how the
Federal Rules of Evidence expose a witness's credibility or mendacity, and
how that result impacts the litigation.26
Fourth, in criminal cases, we discuss who the parties are in the sense of
trying to determine which party is the most deserving of vindication - the
accused or the victim.2 7 Here students see that testimony concerning the
participants' pertinent character traits, an issue which has little to do with
the actual events in question, may have a significant impact on the trial's
outcome.28
Finally, in a time of television shows like CSI Miami, we examine the
role science can play in litigation.29 The use of expert witnesses, opinion
testimony, novel and innovative scientific approaches to solving factual
questions, and how the Supreme Court has developed Article VII of the
25. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence of the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1357 (1985) (discussing litigation's role as a peaceful dispute resolution
mechanism).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 608 (character and specific instance of conduct evidence both admissible
on credibility); FED. R. EVID. 609 (evidence of previous convictions admissible on credibility). See also
Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 752-53 (3d Cit. 2000) (discussing the interrelationship between
Rules 608 and 609, and how they can be effectively applied at trial). An important component of credi-
bility concerns a witness's potential bias in favor of or against one of the parties. Although "bias" is not
specifically provided for in the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts have long admitted it using Rule 608
logic. See United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2008) (defendant must be permitted to ex-
plore a government witness's alleged bias against him).
27. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) permits an accused to introduce testimony of a relevant
or "pertinent" character trait of himself or of the victim. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the "Gro-
tesque" Doctrine of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological
Research, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 741, 762 (2008). In 2000, the Rule was amended and now provides that if
the defendant attacks the character of the victim, the prosecution may then attack the character of the
accused for the same trait. See Christopher W. Behan, When Turnabout is Fair Play: Character Evi-
dence and Self-Defense in Homicide and Assault Cases, 86 OR. L. REV. 733, 737 (2007). A further
amendment to the Rule in 2006 provides that rule is exclusively applicable to criminal cases. Id. at 738.
See also United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (distinguishing pertinent character trait
evidence from testimony dealing with truthfulness).
28. Class discussion here often focuses on the value of character evidence in determining crimi-
nal responsibility when it is juxtaposed with substantive proof of the crime. In United States v. Long,
328 F.3d 655, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the court affirmed appellant's convictions for child sexual abuse
offenses where the issue on appeal centered on the admissibility of an FBI agent testifying as an expert
"'in the field of sexual exploitation of children,' including 'the typology, identification, characteristics,
and strategies of sexual offenders, in particular preferential sexual offenders,' as well as 'the character-
istics and behavior of child victims of sexual abuse."' Defense counsel objected contending this testi-
mony would be improper character evidence under Rule 404(a). Recognizing that the agent's
testimony had already been accepted by two other circuits and was not considered inadmissible profile
evidence, the court held that it "was offered for a permissible purpose, namely to identify the behavior
and actions of child molesters and explain their modus operandi . . . ." Id. at 668. This testimony was
important to the government's explanation of what occurred in a complex case where the defendant
was a Baptist minister indicted for sexually molesting six boys under his care who were all between 13
and 17 years-of-age.
29. See Saby Ghoshray, Untangling the CSI Effect in Criminal Jurisprudence: Circumstantial Evi-
dence, Reasonable Doubt, and Jury Manipulation, 41 NEw ENG. L. REV. 533, 535 (2007) (discussing the
CSI effect on juries and the concern that shows like CSI, in which prosecutors utilize highly sophisti-
cated scientific techniques, are distorting the jury deliberation process by placing an undue burden on
law enforcement agencies and prosecutors and developing a faulty expectation of forensic science re-
quired for convicting a defendant).
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Federal Rules often provides tremendous insight into the evidentiary pro-
cess. 3 0 The first reading assignment requires students to "examine" the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Examine here is defined as becoming familiar
with the general content and construction of the statute. This step also
introduces students to the semantics of evidence. Experience has demon-
strated that early familiarity with the language of evidence makes future
substantive understanding of it easier."
Having examined the rules and discussed their role in litigation, we
look at the regime's four mosaics, discuss their "thematic" significance, and
identify the individual "portraits" or rules in each. 32 This first step allows
students to see the portraits and mosaics regime as a roadmap through the
evidentiary maze. Later, when students are participating in mock trial
competitions, clinical placements or in house clinics, and ultimately when
they are trying real cases as part of their own practice, the regime can be
used as way of ensuring that all applicable rules of evidence are being prop-
erly and thoroughly applied.
Although not immediately apparent to students, The Federal Rules of
Evidence are constructed so that they horizontally and vertically support
each other. For example, as discussed above, Article VIII contains exclu-
sively hearsay rules. These rules must be read together horizontally within
Article VIII in order to understand what hearsay is and how it should be
applied during trial. However, hearsay issues often raise best evidence and
authentication issues,3 3 demonstrating the importance of vertical integra-
tion and consistency.
30. The case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow'Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) provides a wonderful
gen.ral summary of evidentiary principles beyond those concerning expert and opinion testimony
under Rule 702.
31. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Using Graphics to Teach Evidence, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1175
(2006). Presenting diverse ways to explain the rules and by early introduction to the semantics of the
rules, students may have an easier time grasping the more difficult job of actually understanding and
then applying the rules. Any original visual graphic or representation of the rules will likely facilitate
the learning experience.
32. 1 also teach Federal Civil Procedure. In the Preface to Professor Yeazell's excellent
casebook, STEPHEN YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE (7th ed. 2008), he describes the role civil procedure
plays in both legal education and the practice of law. His insights can also be applied to evidence:
[Procedure is] an essential mechanism for presenting substantive questions and as a system that itself
often raises fundamental issues regarding social values. I hope that students will begin to appreciate
that lawyers move the system and that, to a large extent, clients' fates depend on the wisdom, skill, and
judgment of their lawyers. Moreover, although all would agree that cases should not be decided on the
basis of "mere" technicalities, fierce debate quickly arises when one tries to distinguish rules that
merely direct traffic from those that guard the boundaries of fairness.
Id. at xxv.
33. See Edward J. Imwinkelried. The Organization of the Evidence Course: The "Preliminaries"
to Helping Students Develop the Skill of Identifying Nonhearsay, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1047. 1056, 1058
(2006) (advocating that evidence professors teach authentication and best evidence prior to hearsay
because "[a] student who has already learned the value of facial analysis in authentication should be
able to more quickly discern its parallel importance under the hearsay doctrine," and "[i]f the teacher
exposes the student to the flow of best evidence analysis before turning to hearsay. the student should
find it much easier to grasp the sequence of hearsay analysis" because "[the] overall flow of best evi-
dence analysis is quite analogous to the sequence of hearsay analysis.").
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Set out below is the general content and sequencing of the first several
class meetings. As stated above, this article does not attempt to present a
script of what might be said or even covered during those classes. 34 In-
stead, the points raised here are an attempt to demonstrate the detail and
approach used during those first sessions." Substance is confined to histor-
ical and philosophical perspectives, general definitions, major points, se-
mantical familiarity, and ultimately demystifying the statute and its
application. In many ways the first classes are like an opening statement -
a menu of what is to come.36
B. The Themes, Portraits and Mosaics Regime of the
Federal Rules of Evidence
Substantive evidence instruction begins with a discussion of each mo-
saic's "theme." The next step involves identifying the individual portraits
within each mosaic and then linking them horizontally and vertically. Ex-
perience demonstrates that beginning the course with this examination fa-
cilitates students "getting" what the Rules are about from the beginning.
Category A describes the "evidentiary process." These rules are best
seen as defining the overarching macro formula supporting the admission
of all proof. Category B concerns the "evidentiary mechanics" for trying a
case. These are the rules litigators use every day in every case. They are
much less philosophical and much more practical. Most importantly, they
are the rules trial lawyers do not have the time or opportunity to look up
during trial. Category C identifies those Federal Rules of Evidence de-
signed to increase the amount of proof reaching lay finders of fact, one of
the major conceptual distinctions between the common law and the Fed-
eral Rules.3 1 Category D addresses those provisions controlling character
and credibility proof. This area is complex, confusing, and can be predic-
tive of a trial's outcome.
34. However, it has been constructed so that a new professor to evidence can follow it in some
detail as a way of introducing the subject matter to students, and as a vehicle for providing that over-
arching view of evidence, which hopefully will help create confidence and support for the classes to
follow.
35. Certainly other Articles or Rules of Evidence could be introduced here or at any other stage
of this overview. As employed here, the regime is intentionally limited to those principles which will be
most helpful early on and is intended to be only a conceptual starting point, a straw man which can be
easily changed and amended to satisfy each professor's style and interests.
36. Similarly, my final review of the course is much like a closing argument. The portraits and
mosaics regime is flushed out to contain virtually every Rule we have discussed during the semester and
where it fits in the regime's structure.
37. The Federal Rules of Evidence favor admissibility and reject the notion that to be admissible
proof has to possess a "greater level of probative value than that which we might apply in everyday
matters." Robert P. Burns, Notes of the Future of Evidence Law, 74 TEMP. L. REv. 69, 79 (2001).
Instead the Rules adopt a much lower standard of probative value and provide that the offered evi-
dence simply must possess some tendency to make a fact at bar more or less probable than it would be
without the proof. Id.
38. The legal basis for admitting character and credibility evidence is often difficult for law stu-
dents to decipher. An excellent example of this was explored in Charles H. Rose III, Should the Tail
Wag the Dog? The Potential Effects of Recidivism Data on Character Evidence Rules, 36 N.M.L. REV.
341 (2006). Professor Rose's insightful article illuminates empirical research on the value character and
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II. EXAMINING THE REGIME
A. Category A: Articles IV, VI, VIII, IX - The "Evidentiary Process"
Early in the semester students would frequently complain that while
the individual Federal Rules of Evidence made sense, learning them seria-
tim did little to demonstrate how they are actually used in a courtroom.
One of the portraits and mosaics regime's greatest values resides in ad-
dressing this issue at the beginning of the course. Because the regime facil-
itates introducing all the major Rules of Evidence virtually simultaneously,
the regime provides an overarching view of both the forest and the trees.
Category A demonstrates that the Rules of Evidence are divided into
11 generally consistent substantive areas called Articles. After looking at
each Article we focus on Articles IV, VI, VIII, IX, and X because, when
read together, they define the basic evidentiary process for admitting any
item of proof: relevance,40 witness competence,4 1 the prohibition against
hearsay,42 the requirements for authenticity43 and the need for best
evidence.44
This first mosaic can be seen as a logic drill. It introduces students to
the substantive discipline of litigation: only proof which qualifies for admis-
sion under the Federal Rules of Evidence will reach the finders of fact.
Students also see that although this mosaic conceptually applies to all of-
fers of proof, not all aspects of the mosaic will apply to every offer. For
example, hearsay maybe not be an issue in every offer, but the possibility
of a hearsay objection is a consideration virtually every time counsel con-
template offering an item of evidence.
1. Article IV. - Relevance and its Limits
Relevance initiates the conversation because, logically, it is the first
step trial lawyers use in determining what proof is going to be offered and
credibility evidence plays in predicting and measuring recidivism. Id. at 342. Professor Rose indicates
that many of the assumptions made particularly as they apply to sexual offenses (see FED. R. EVID. 412-
415), may have to be rethought:
Recent studies indicate that there is a strong statistical correlation between previous convic-
tions for both property crimes and drug crimes and recidivating offenses that constitute the
same type of misconduct. These studies expose the fact that the statistical correction between
previous convictions for sexual misconduct and recidivating offenses of the same type is low,
calling into question the current evidentiary treatment of sexual offenses.
Id.
39. This process is similar to being blind folded and told to identify a large animal by starting at
its feet and working your way up until you have accumulated enough information to make an educated
guess about what type of creature it might be and what it could be used for.
40. FED .R. EVID. 401. Definition of Relevant Evidence.
41. FED. R. EVID. 601. General Rule of Competency.
42. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Definitions.
43. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). Requirement of Authentication or Identification (a) General
provision.
44. FED. R. EVID. 1002. Requirement of Original.
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admitted at trial.4 5 If the contemplated evidence does not have "any ten-
dency" to affect a consequential aspect of the litigation, there is no reason
to admit it.4 6 Irrelevant proof would likely waste the jurors' time, or worse,
distract or confuse them.4 7 Although counterintuitive on the first day of
class, it is important for students to know that relevant, otherwise admissi-
ble proof may be excluded because it is too powerful, 48 or because it vio-
lates important legal and social policies.4 9 In this first mosaic students
learn that the balance between admissibility and exclusion is not linear,
mathematical or even strictly legal, but imprecise, subjective, and depen-
dant on many considerations, legal and otherwise. 0
Although it will be covered later, our early discussion of the relevancy
standard demonstrates that it is easy to meet." Rule 401 is clear statutory
preference for jurors to hear all admissible and helpful evidence because
there is a correlation between the amount of information admitted and the
accuracy of verdicts.52 It is also important for students to know that rele-
vance must be established with each offer and that no item of evidence is
45. "The starting point for all questions of admissibility, including the admissibility of other acts
evidence, is relevance." Jim Gash, Punitive Damages, Other Acts Evidence, and the Constitution, 2004
UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1211 (2004).
46. FED. R. EvID. 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence
Inadmissible.
47. FED. R. EvID. 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or
Waste of Waste of Time.
48. See Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal Schol-
arship, Teaching and Ethics, 21 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 813, 858 (2003) for Professor Scallen's description
of her first evidence class where she emphasizes Rule 102 and asks her students whether the goal of
Evidence law is to obtain the historical truth about an event, and if so, "how can we justify the existence
of privileges, which often exclude the most relevant and reliable evidence about past events?"
49. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule
of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV.
879 (1988). Professor Imwinkelried argues that the prejudice prong of Rule 403 only permits a judge to
exclude relevant evidence when such evidence "poses a risk to the integrity of the fact-finding process,"
and does not permit a judge to bar relevant evidence in order to uphold an extrinsic social policy such
as encouraging plea bargaining. Id. at 884.
50. The drafters of 403 intentionally eliminated a distinction between mandatory exclusion and
discretionary exclusion of relevant evidence, which resulted in giving trial judges a great deal of discre-
tion when performing a 403 balancing test. Michael J. Pavloski, Old Chief v. United States: Interpreta-
tion and Misapplication of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 33 NEw ENG. L. REV. 797, 801 (1999). When
balancing between the probative value and the prejudicial effect of a piece of evidence, trial judges are
vested with broad discretion in deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence and should "take special
care to use it sparingly." Id. at 803. Unfortunately, within the Rule, there are no specific guidelines for
identifying or measuring the danger of unfair prejudice and "[h]ow the courts use their discretion to
exclude evidence under Rule 403 can neither be predicted nor effectively reviewed." Victor J. Gold,
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 497, 498 (1983).
51. Douglas v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d 1339, 1344 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence may not
be excluded if it has even the slightest probative worth, and also distinguishing between relevance and
sufficiency of evidence. To be admissible evidence need not be sufficient to prove the point in issue,
only relevant to it.).
52. A very interesting application of this theory can be seen in United States v. Amado-Nunez,
357 F.3d 119, 121-22 (1st Cir. 2004). There appellant's conviction for transporting counterfeit tax
stamps in interstate or foreign commerce was affirmed despite his contention that the government
failed to present evidence proving that the stamps traveled in interstate or foreign commerce. Id. at
122. In resolving the issue against appellant the court took a very expansive view of relevance and
proof the jury zcould consider by finding that a "vast array of 'background' facts commonly considered
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inherently relevant. However, most often relevance will be obvious and
there will be no need for specific litigation establishing that point.
In many ways, relevance is the essence of the portraits and mosaics
regime. 54  It is never enough to say that because evidence is relevant it
must be admitted. Admission is tied to satisfying all applicable rules of
evidence. As soon as students grasp this logic, their view of the Federal
Rules begins to take on those interrelationship properties the portraits and
mosaics regime was designed to teach.
2. Article VI. - Witnesses
Beginning evidence students tend to see the introduction of proof as
being connected to a witness testifying on the stand. As a result, Article VI
is the next logical place to explore. We begin with a general conversation
about the term "competence" being used here to define witnesses not items
of evidence." As will be discussed later, the Article is written broadly to
encourage individuals with personal knowledge to come forward and pre-
sent their testimony.56
by judges and juries" is admissible. Id. at 121. The court went on to say that "[tihese background or
evaluative facts cover the whole range of human experience from the rough meaning of common terms
('city') to science (a full moon illuminates a scene) to human psychology (a witness who is related to
one of the parties might be biased)." Id. at 121-22. For example, the court opined:
When a witness says 'car,' everyone, judge and jury included, furnishes, from non-evidence
sources within himself, the supplementing information that the 'car' is an automobile, not a
railroad car, that it is self-propelled, probably by an internal combustion engine, that it may be
assumed to have four wheels with pneumatic rubber tires, and so on. The judicial process
cannot construct every case from scratch, like Descartes creating a world based on the postu-
late [Cogito, ergo sum]. These items could not possibly be introduced into evidence, and no
one suggests that they be.
Id. at 122. Connecting their expansive view to the role juries play the court said that "[f]act-finders rely
upon such background references or propositions all the time in deciding whether something did or did
not happen; and this is permissible. . ." without resort to Rule 201 and judicial notice. Id.
53. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, LEE D. SCHINASI & DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL, §401.02[4] (6th ed. 2006):
Relevancy must be established with respect to every item of evidence. No evidence possesses
inherent relevance. The trial judge has four basic choices with respect to ruling on relevance
issues: (1) exclude the evidence; (2) admit the evidence; (3) admit the evidence subject to a
limiting instruction; or (4) admit part of the evidence and exclude part of the evidence.
In deciding which ruling to make, trial judges should require counsel to do three things: (1)
describe the evidence; (2) explain its nexus to the consequential issue at bar; and (3) indicate
how the offered evidence will establish the fact in question.
54. For example, because Rule 402 states that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court," Professor Imwinkelried reasons that there is a strong
argument that this rule abolishes any common law exclusionary rule that has not been reduced to
statute. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Silence Speaks Volumes: A Brief Reflection on the Question of
Whether it is Necessary or Even Desirable to Fill the Seeming Gaps in Article V1 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Governing the Admissibility of Evidence Logically Relevant to the Witness's Credibility, 2004
UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1015 (2004).
55. FED. R. EVID 601. General Rule of Competence. See also United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d
1052 (6th Cir. 1993) (eligibility to be a witness depends on the content of the proposed witness's
testimony).
56. See Idaho v. Wright, 47 U.S. 805. 825 (1990) (in child victim cases, the Supreme Court re-
jected a per se exclusionary rule approach preventing juries from hearing child witness testimony simply
because the witness was incompetent to testify).
2010] "PORTRAITS, MOSAICS AND THEMES" 95
The Federal Rules' treatment of competence eliminates many of the
common law infirmities that prevented witnesses from testifying.57 Limita-
tions based on age, credibility problems,59 mental and physical limita-
tions,60 drug use and intoxication, 61 and previous hypnosis62 for example
are no longer justifiable reasons to categorically exclude witnesses.
The basic criteria for testifying under the Federal Rules requires a
demonstrated intention to tell the truth 6 3 and personal knowledge about
the events in question. 64  All other witness deficiencies the common law
would have used to prevent the witness from testifying are now areas for
opposing counsel to cross-examine the witness on.65  Discussing compe-
tence and impeachment at this point allows us to introduce the concept of
how much "weight" admitted evidence will be accorded by the jury, and
how counsel can affect that result.6 6 Students begin to see that although a
57. Rule 601 provides that every person is competent to testify and as a result few potential
witnesses are disqualified on competency grounds. Jane Dever Prince, Competency and Credibility:
Double Trouble for Child Victims of Sexual Offenses, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & Ar. ADvoc. 113, 116
(2004). Judges tend to exercise discretion in favor of allowing a witness to testify even if the witness is
feeble or has been in a mental institution, as long as the witness possesses sufficient knowledge concern-
ing the nature and consequence of the oath, and has the ability to communicate with the jury. Id.
58. See United State v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994) (court affirmed a RICO conviction find-
ing no abuse of discretion in allowing a 6 year-old to testify).
59. See United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1990) (witness with numerous previous
inconsistent statements found competent to testify; court opined issue goes only to credibility which is
an area reserved exclusively for the jury).
60. See United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1990) (no error in allowing witness who had
suffered a severe psychiatric event and been hospitalized for it from testifying).
61. See United States v. Killian, 524 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1975) (no error in refusing to strike
testimony of admitted drug abuser).
62. See United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) (no error when six government
witnesses who had previously been hypnotized testified against the accused. Court refused to apply a
"sweeping rule of inadmissibility").
63. FED. R. EVID 603. See also United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1993) (this rule of
evidence is satisfied if the witness recognizes a solemn duty to tell the truth).
64. FED. R. EvIm 602. There are two important regime characteristics which should be consid-
ered here. The first is that a witness's basis of knowledge will always be a consideration for hearsay
purposes. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c) ("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted").
Second, as the rule itself states, expert witness and opinion testimony issues pursuant to Rule 703 may
always be involved here. See Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987) (error for
witness to present testimony based on information gleaned from a hearsay statement), and Agfa-
Gevaert, A.G. v. A.B. Dick Co., 879 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1989) (inferential assessments about a prod-
uct's quality are admissible as long as commonly drawn by experts in the area).
65. Rule 601 does not require an examination of a witness to determine his or her competency;
rather, counsel can raise the issue of credibility through cross-examination. Rule 601: General Rule of
Competency, 12 ToURo L. REV. 477, 478 (1996). Prior to enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the Supreme Court started to diverge from the common law by finding that the goal of getting to the
truth will be better accomplished "by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding"
and recognized that the credit and weight of such testimony should be determined by the jury or by the
court instead of simply rejecting the witnesses as incompetent. Id.
66. Because the standard for admissibility under Rule 601 is extremely liberal, factors that relate
to competency, such as the witness's ability to perceive, go to the weight of the testimony rather than its
admissibility. Fred Warren Bennett, How to Administer the "Big Hurt" in a Criminal Case: The Life
and Times of Federal Rule of Evidence 806, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135. 1143 (1995). Therefore, the
witness's ability to perceive may be impeached. Id. Rule 601 also governs the impeachment of a wit-
ness's memory, recollection, and ability to communicate. Id. at 1145-46.
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witness may testify consistent with the proponent's intent, opposing coun-
sel's cross-examination and impeachment may render that witness's testi-
mony of little value, no value, damaging to the proponent, or even helpful
to the opponent.67
Philosophically, broad-based rules like those addressing relevance and
witness competence place greater responsibilities on trial lawyers than the
common law did. The proponent of evidence needs to know what price
may have to be paid for calling a witness who has helpful testimony but can
be effectively impeached.68
Article VI provides several ways of attacking and supporting a witness.
Among the most important concerns are attacking the witness's honesty,69
impeaching her with past relevant inconsistent statements, 70 and evidence
of her bias or conflicts of interest.7 1 This line of reasoning leads to conver-
sations about pretrial investigations, depositions, witness preparation, and
the connection between thorough research and favorable trial results. 72
3. Article VIII. - Hearsay
A difficult question evidence professors have long struggled with is at
what point in the traditional evidence course should hearsay be taught?73
Resolving this question became even more difficult when the Supreme
67. For instance, in a criminal trial, a defendant must decide whether she wants to testify, but
once she does in fact testify "she is subject to cross-examination, including impeachment by prior con-
victions, and the decision to take the stand may prove damaging instead of helpful." Ohler v. United
States, 529 U.S. 753, 757 (2000).
68. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. REv.
991, 996 (2007). Professor Poulin discusses how Rule 608(a) can be used to impeach a witness's credi-
bility after that witness has testified. Id. at 997. She indicates that opposing counsel can use Rule
608(a) to attack the witness's character for credibility with reputation or opinion evidence, and Rule
608(b) to conduct the same attack with evidence of specific instances of conduct. Id. After the witness
has been attacked her the proponent may attempt to rehabilitate her credibility with similar positive
evidence. Id.
69. See FED. R. EvID 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness [for truthfulness];
FED. R. EVID 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime.
70. See FED. R. EvIn 613. Prior Statements of Witness (when statements are not being offered
for the truth); FED. R. EVID 804(b)(1). Former Testimony (when statements are being offered for the
truth).
71. See United States v. Harper, 514 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2008) (in prosecution for drug offenses it
was error to exclude misdemeanor conviction of informant as it may have demonstrated bias to seek
favorable treatment from prosecution in exchange for testimony against the accused).
72. At this point in class we often discuss one of the interesting distinctions between law school
and the practice of law. In law school we give students the facts and ask them to identify and interrelate
the applicable law. In practice the opposite generally occurs. We generally know the law. The task
there is to discover, collect and apply the operative facts to the law in a way that most benefits our
client's case while having the opposite effect on our opponent's case. The more thorough counsel's
investigation is the more likely his client's case will be favorably resolved. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495. 512 (1947), the court sought to encourage lawyers to work diligently on their clients' cases by
protecting "work product" beyond the attorney-client privilege's limits. See also Dan K. Webb & J.
David Reich, Trial Strategy: Prior Statements, 780 PL/LIT 935, 937 (2008) (authors discuss the discovery
and trial use of pretrial witness-interview memoranda).
73. For example, Professor Paul Rothstein writes about his decision to change the point at which
he introduces hearsay into his curriculum. Rothstein, supra note 18, at 1002. He states that for years he
taught hearsay and its exceptions first, after a general introduction to evidence. Id. However, he now
follows the Federal Rules order teaching hearsay much later in the course. Id.
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Court decided Crawford v. Washington and changed the standard for ad-
mitting out of court statements in criminal cases.74
Teaching hearsay at the beginning of the course answers many general
questions students have about the Rules of Evidence and naturally about
this most important category of rules. Unfortunately, it also has the ten-
dency to create confusion because students are not yet familiar enough
with the statute to understand hearsay's importance or application. Waiting
until after the basic evidence principles have been taught solves that prob-
lem but creates others. For example, while discussing the precursor rules
students will often ask questions having a hearsay component, only to be
told that in order to avoid confusion that question will be discussed later in
the semester when hearsay is covered. This serialized approach to evi-
dence augers against students being able to put together the constellation
of dots which is the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The portraits and mosaics regime attempts to solve this problem by
briefly defining hearsay on the first day of class and then linking it to the
other rules of evidence it will generally be used with.76 No attempt is made
at this time to explain Rule 801 or the constitutional questions raised by
Crawford." The idea of hearsay, a brief historical view of how and why it
developed, and an overview of how it fits within the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence defines class discussion.
Hearsay also provides a vehicle for delving into general historical evi-
dentiary principles.7 9 For example, the common law favored trials com-
posed of live witnesses testifying about events they had personal
74. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36. See Matthew M. Staab, Note, Child's Play: Avoiding
the Pitfalls of Crawford v. Washington in Child Abuse Prosecution, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 501, 539 (2005)
(Supreme Court rejected Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) reliability standard for admitting out of
court statements against criminal defendants in favor of the Constitution's requirement for confronta-
tion when applied to "testimonial" statements). See also Tom Lininger, Davis and Hammon: A Step
Forward, or a Step Back?, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 28 (2006) (discussing Crawford's
definition of testimonial evidence).
75. See Imwinkelried, supra note 33, at 1052 (encouraging evidence professors to avoid the temp-
tation to begin their course with hearsay and instead first teach "preliminaries" that will aid students in
recognizing nonhearsay including the competency of prospective witnesses, the authentication of evi-
dence, logical relevance, notably non-character theories, and the best evidence rule).
76. See FED. R. EVID. Art. IX. Authentication and Identification; FED R. EVID. Article X. Con-
tents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs.
77. Paul W. Grimm & Jerome E. Deise, Jr., Hearsay, Confrontation, and Forfeiture by Wrongdo-
ing: Crawford v. Washington, A Reassessment of the Confrontation Clause, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 7 (2004)
(discussing the plethora of questions raised by Crawford v. Washington).
78. Great reads on these topics are contained in Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REV. 177 (1948), Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating
Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974), and MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE, AN INTRODUCTORY
PROBLEM APPROACH 74-76 (2002). All provide wonderful insights and explanatory applications for
complex hearsay topics.
79. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004), the Court provided a concise history of
hearsay's development in the United States from the time of the Founders until today:
We do not read the historical sources to say that a prior opportunity to cross-examine was
merely a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for admissibility of testimonial state-
ments. They suggest that this requirement was dispositive, and not merely one of several ways
to establish reliability. This is not to deny, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE notes, that "[tihere were
always exceptions to the general rule of exclusion" of hearsay evidence.... But there is scant
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knowledge of.80 Any other type of evidence, when offered for its truth,
was presumptively unreliable because it was predicated upon what another
person outside the courtroom previously said. Because that person was not
in court testifying, his truthfulness and demeanor could not be challenged,
observed and measured by the jury." The result was exclusion of such
testimony and information.
Over the years, common law rules defining hearsay addressed its ex-
clusionary tendencies and developed reliable exceptions to the prohibition.
The Federal Rules of Evidence built on and extended that history. Codifi-
cation lead to greater admissibility, consistency and predictability.82 How-
ever, it can be argued that with the Crawford line of cases, the Supreme
Court has worked against those results adding uncertainty and new limits
on the amount of evidence which can be admitted in criminal trials."
Category A's discussion of hearsay begins by scanning Article VIII,
then discussing Rule 801's definitional concepts, Rule 802's prohibition,
and then Rule 803's exceptions. Rule 803's 23 exceptions are approached
by dividing them into four categories and then identifying each rule within
each category. The discussion is limited to definitional concepts.
The first Rule 803 category covers exceptions (1)-(4) which concern
evidence dealing with the declarant's state of mind, emotional or physical
condition. The second set is composed of exceptions (5) - (18) which ad-
dress the admissibility of writings, documents or proof of their absence.
evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a
criminal case. Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not
testimonial - for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. We do
not infer from these that the Framers thought exceptions would apply even to prior testimony.
(Footnotes omitted.)
80. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho: Refocusing on the
Bottomlines of Reliability and Necessity, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 185. 186 (2000) (stating that the common law
hearsay doctrine reflected a preference for live testimony by witnesses subject to cross-examination).
81. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial
right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the
demeanor of the witness.").
82. See FED R. EVID. Article VIII advisory committee's note:
The approach to hearsay in these rules is that of the common law, i.e., a general rule excluding
hearsay, with exceptions under which evidence is not required to be excluded even though
hearsay. The traditional hearsay exceptions are drawn upon for the exceptions, collected
under two rules [Rule 803 and 804], one dealing with situations where availability of the de-
clarant is regarded as immaterial and the other with those where unavailability is made a
condition to the admission of the hearsay statement. [The rules also have] a provision for
hearsay statements not within one of the specified exceptions "but having comparable circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness." [Rule 807]. This plan is submitted as calculated to
encourage growth and development in this area of the law, while conserving the values and
experience of the past as a guide to the future.
83. Crawford. 546 U.S. 36 [and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)] provided new and
uncertain standards for determining if "testimonial" statements can be admitted when the declarant is
unavailable and has not previously been subjected to cross-examination. Thomas J. Walsh, The Con-
frontation Clause after Crawford v. Washington: Clarifying the Meaning of Testimonial Statements in
Criminal Trials, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 163, 163 (2008). In Melendez-Dias v. Massachusetts, 129 S.
Ct. 2527 (2009), the Court extended Crawford holding that "certificates of analysis" (laboratory re-
ports) were testimonial evidence and therefore violative of the Sixth Amendment when used to demon-
strate the accused's illegal possession of a controlled substance.
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We focus on (6), Records of Regularly Conducted Activity (business docu-
ments), and (8) Public Records and Reports (government documents) be-
cause they are the most commonly encountered. Set three covers
exceptions (19) - (21) which deal with reputation evidence. This set is
largely a conversation about Rule 803(21) and its connection to Rules 405
(character) and 608 (credibility). The mosaic qualities of the Rules and the
need to apply them uniformly and together is highlighted. Set four con-
cerns exceptions (22) and (23) which allow evidence of previous judicial
judgments concerning criminal convictions, family history, or borders to be
admitted. Exception (22)'s relationship with Rule 609 consumes most of
the class discussion here.
Next is Rule 804, containing the third set of exemptions/exceptions to
the prohibition against hearsay.84 We spend a considerable amount of time
discussing this rule because of its unique requirement for initially establish-
ing the declarant's unavailability and because of its forfeiture provisions.
To make this point, students are asked to place Rules 803 and 804 side-by-
side and then identify the differences. The conversation quickly turns to
how different the foundations are for admitting each category of proof, the
levels of reliability, potentials for abuse each category possesses, and the
drafter's intention to distinguish and categorize each. When Rule 801(d) is
added to the mix, the pragmatic need for exceptions to the hearsay rule
becomes clear. Without the exceptions/exclusions, litigation as we know it
would not be possible. Students can see that, while testimony flowing from
an exception or exclusion may not be as reliable as in-court testimony
would be if a proper foundation is established, such testimony is reliable
enough to be admitted.
The last hearsay provision discussed is Rule 807's "residual excep-
tion."86 This is an important conversation because it is the first time stu-
dents have the opportunity to juxtapose the common law of evidence with
the Federal Rules of Evidence." The class is asked to explore why Con-
gress felt it would be "presumptuous to assume that all possible desirable
84. FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (requiring that the declarant be unavailable before its provisions can be
used and providing five definitions of unavailability).
85. FED. R. EVID 804(b)(6). See also Garcia-Martinez v. City & Country of Denver, 392 F.3d
1187 (10th Cir. 2004) (no error to exclude deposition of plaintiff when his absence at trial was calcu-
lated and due to the procurement of wrongdoing).
86. On December 1, 1997, Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) were combined to create Rule 807.
Daniel Capra, Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence That May Require Clarifica-
tion, 182 F.R.D. 268, 286 (1999). The legislative history and judicial applications of the previous two
rules were intended to directly apply to the new rule. Id.
87. Professor Imwinkelried finds Rule 807, as well as Rules 301 and 501, useful for opening a
discussion of the "common-law methodology." Edward J. lmwinkelried, Using the Evidence Course as
a Vehicle for Teaching Legisprudential Skills, 21 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 907, 912 (2003). He explains that
these Rules compel, rather than merely permit, the courts to continue utilizing the common law. Id.
Specifically, under Rule 807, when deciding whether to admit hearsay that does not fall within an enu-
merated exception, courts are required to consider common law applications. Id.
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exceptions to the hearsay rule have been catalogued.""8 Why would Con-
gress make a special provision for hearsay and not for other evidence top-
ics? It is important for students to understand that when the Federal Rules
were adopted they were intended to occupy the field of evidence and that
the common law was there only to help interpret voids or uncertainties in
the rules. Judges could not modify or ignore the rules.8 9
Rule 807 is different. Congress intended it to facilitate growth in this
most complex of all evidentiary areas. The rule provides trial judges with
broad powers to effectuate this growth but with the caveat that the power
is to be used sparingly90 and only in exceptional circumstances. 91 This
"catchall" mentality most often is used to admit hearsay statements when
the circumstances surrounding them do not fit within any of the "enumer-
ated exceptions" and yet the evidence has sufficient independent guaran-
tees of trustworthiness to justify its admission.92
At this point in the conversation students begin wondering how judges
decide when to use Rule 807 or any other rule for that matter. They want
to know if there is a calculus to this process beyond the rules' own words. 93
Class discussion leads them to discover that there is a formula but that it is
very subjective and generally referred to as "judicial discretion." Because
judicial discretion is a concept we deal with all semester, this detour has
always proven to be worthwhile.
88. See FED R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee's note:
[The rule] does not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but [it does] provide for
treating new and presently unanticipated situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness with the spirit
of the specifically stated exceptions. Within this framework, room is left for growth and development
of the law of evidence in the hearsay area, consistently with the broad purposes expressed in Rule 102.
89. For an interesting discussion on the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee's role in
this process see Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Tending to the Past
and Pretending for the Future?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 832-33 (2002) (showing that the committee and
the Supreme Court worked to limit trial and appellate court judges' common law powers over evidence
so that they no longer have the authority "to amend bad or inadequate rules, create non-existent rules,
resolve conflicts between rules, and ignore language that is inconsistent with the goals of a particular
rule.").
90. Congress intended for the catchall exceptions to be used in rare and exceptional circum-
stances; however, data suggests that the catchall exceptions are being used much more generally than
the legislature intended. James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 787, 790-91 (1993); Steven Zeidman, Who Needs an Evidence Code?: The New York Court
of Appeals's Radical Re-Evaluation of Hearsay, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 211, 239 (1999) (although the
legislature intended for Rule 807 to be used sparingly, the residual exception has overwhelmed the
hearsay rule).
91. Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., 922 F.2d 272, 281 (5th Cir. 1991) ("the residual exception
must be used sparingly"); S. REP. N. 93-1277 at 7065 (1974) (rarely and in exceptional circumstances).
92. For example, computer-generated animations do not fit within any of the enumerated excep-
tions so they can only be entered into evidence through a hearsay catch-all rule. Dean A. Morande, A
Class of Their Own: Model Procedural Rules and Evidentiary Evaluation of Computer-Generated "Ani-
mations," 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069, 1108 (2007). As long as evidence that does not fit within one of
the listed exceptions of the hearsay rule, Rule 807 provides that the evidence is admissible if it has the
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Carole E. Powell, Computer Generated Visual
Evidence: Does Daubert Make a Difference?, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 577, 586-587 (1996). This requires
the court to determine whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable, not unfairly prejudicial, and com-
plies with the Rule's own internal standards. Id. at 587.
93. See M. LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 802 (1972) (discussing
the difficulty in recognizing when the hearsay prohibition applies).
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When courts review a trial judge's decision concerning questions of
fact and law, such as the admissibility of a hearsay statement, they do so
under an "abuse of discretion standard."9 4 Generally the reviewing court
will say that the trial judge abused her discretion if her findings of fact are
clearly erroneous or her conclusions of law are incorrect." Although we
will come back to some of this when we discussion Rule 103(a) in Category
B, even if the judge abused his discretion and made an error, relief will
generally be granted only where there was harm that materially prejudiced
the appellant's substantial rights.96
4. Article IX. - Authentication and Identification
To a great extent, hearsay, authentication and best evidence are intro-
duced as a mosaic of their own. In the beginning it is difficult for students
to define where one begins and where the others leave off. As the semes-
ter unfolds we will spend a great deal of time clarifying the distinctions, but
our goal here is simply to introduce the concepts and help students see how
they will fit together.9 7 Familiarity with the semantics of evidence remains
important as well.
The connection between hearsay and authentication is an important
one. Students come to see that these requirements are often applied to-
gether at trial and therefore need to be considered together in class. Both
are foundational evidentiary requirements, both share a liberal standard
favoring admissibility, yet neither or only one may be in issue when a piece
of evidence is offered.98
We begin by looking at authentication as a generic term applied to the
process of identifying an item of evidence, insuring that the item is what it
94. See Eddy v. Waffle House, Inc., 482 F.3d 674, 682 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming judgment for
defendant in this civil rights case, the court concluded that excluding plaintiff's hearsay statements did
not constitute an abuse of discretion because the trial judge's resolution was not "arbitrary and
irrational").
95. See United States v. Duran Samaniego, 345 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) ("We review the
district court's evidentiary ruling only for an abuse of discretion, and we will reverse only if [the mo-
vant] convinces us that an erroneous ruling 'resulted in a substantial prejudicial effect."').
96. See Lataille v. Ponte, 754 F.2d 33. 37 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Our standard for determining whether
the admission of such evidence is harmless error is whether we can say "with fair assurance . . . that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. . . . The centrality of the evidence, its prejudicial
effect, whether it is cumulative, the use of the evidence by counsel, and the closeness of the case are all
factors which bear on this determination."') (citation omitted).
97. In this high-tech age, jurors are more likely to retain information when it is presented in
visual forms such as graphs, pictures, or enlargements of documents. Katrina Grider, Goodbye Flip
Charts, Hello Plasma Screens, 68 TEx. B.J. 567, 567 (2005).
98. Computerized business records provide an example for how courts interrelate hearsay and
authentication. As professor Romano suggests, some courts will initially consider whether such evi-
dence has been properly authenticated under Rule 901. Leigh Voigt Romano, Comment, Electronic
Evidence and the Federal Rules, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2005). If the court determines that
the evidence has been properly authenticated, the court will then determine whether the evidence is
hearsay and if so whether it falls within an exception to Rule 802. Id. Computerized business records
most likely qualify for admission under Rule 803(6)'s business records exception. Id. Other courts
ignore the authentication analysis and go straight to the hearsay exception. Id. at 1751-52.
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purports to be, is accurate, or has an historical connection to the case. 99 At
this early stage, the easiest way for students to visualize authentication is by
using examples. They are asked to contemplate being plaintiff's counsel in
a civil suit and in possession of a letter defendant sent to plaintiff confess-
ing liability. Students are then asked to consider how they would prove
that the letter is authentic, that it was actually written by defendant.'o
Next, students are asked how in a murder case they would prove that the
handgun seized from the accused is the same handgun used to commit the
crime and the same handgun being offered in evidence?' 0 1 Similarly, in a
drug trafficking case, how would the prosecution establish that the white
powdery substance seized from the accused is the same white powdery sub-
stance tested in a forensic laboratory, determined to be a controlled sub-
stance, and ultimately offered in court.'02
These examples help students appreciate how and why authentication
protects juries from fabricated, fraudulent, or altered evidence. 0 ' Students
99. If a proponent offers a writing or any tangible object into evidence, that item must be sup-
ported by sufficient proof for the judge to conclude that the writing or tangible object is what it is
claimed to be. Miguel A. Mendez, Authentication and the Best and Secondary Evidence Rules, 41 U.S.F.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2006). The authentication rule favors admissibility: as long as the judge concludes that a
reasonable jury could find the writing or tangible object to be what the proponent says it is, then the
judge must let the issue of the writing or tangible object's authenticity go to the jury. Id. The opposing
party may offer evidence to counter authenticity of the writing or object, but that evidence will gener-
ally be used by a jury to determine who to believe. Id. at 3-4. Moreover, the questioned evidence is
admissible as long as the proponent can connect it with an issue in the case to demonstrate its rele-
vance. Id. at 4.
100. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2). See also United States v. Samet, 200 F. Appx. 15 (2d Cir. 2006)
(affirming racketerring convictions the court held that postal inspector could identify the handwriting in
question because he spent 80% of three years investigating the case, did not gain the knowledge in
question for the purposes of prosecution, and his opinion was admissible pursuant to Rules 901(b)(2)
and 701(lay opinion testimony)).
101. In Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Serv., Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1074 (D. Minn. 1999), the
court described the proponent's burden of proof under Rule 901 as being "slight; it 'need only show a
foundation from which the factfinder could legitimately infer that the evidence is what the proponent
claims it to be."' The court went on hold that after proponent's prima facie showing, any doubts raised
by the opponent "simply go to the weight of that evidence, which will be assigned by the trier of fact,
and does not go to the admissibility of that evidence." Id.
102. In United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 2003), authenticity was established by the
government using the following chain of custody:
(i) a videotape [showing the accused] giving the substance to [an informant]; (ii) a DEA
agent's testimony regarding the government's surveillance of [the informant] for most of the
time before, during, and after the videotaped transaction; (iii) an agent's testimony regarding
the DEA's field-testing and storage of the drugs; and (iv) the testimony of the forensic chemist
who subjected the substance to laboratory testing.
The court went on to say that the government does not have to "rule out all possibilities
inconsistent with authenticity, or . . . prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it
purports to be. Breaks in the chain of custody do not bear upon the admissibility of evidence,
only the weight of the evidence."
Id. (citations omitted).
103. For an excellent discussion of authentication's value in litigation and various ways of estab-
lishing an item of evidence's historical connection to the case see Paul Giannelli, supra note 14.
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see that although the common law always required authenticity to be estab-
lished,1 04 the Federal Rules make the process easier by creating less time
consuming and witness intensive methods.10 5  Conversation then turns to
how courts apply these standards in a way that minimizes the potential for
fabrication. The early conclusion reached is that the greater the risk the
higher the standard.106
5. Article X. - Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs
Classroom coverage of best evidence topics parallels the limited scope
used with authentication.0o Students are reminded that best evidence,
hearsay and authentication are really a mosaic within a mosaic and that
they need to consider the applicability of all when any one is raised. Au-
thentication and best evidence share a liberal standard favoring admis-
sion.' 08 As a practical matter, this is because computers, copy machines
and other forms of digital data storage and retention have largely elimi-
nated the common law's concern about the accuracy and consistency of
documents. The best evidence rule was originally designed to place a
heavy burden on establishing that copies were faithful to the original docu-
ments. 109 Today, when computers can process endless digitally precise rep-
licas of an original document, the same concerns no longer exist.
104. This area is thoroughly and insightfully explored in Victor E. Bianchini & Harvey Bass, A
Paradigm for the Authentication of Photographic Evidence in the Digital Age, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
303, 319-20 (1998) and Stephen A. Kolodny, Your Case in Evidence, 19 FAM. ADvoc. 17, 18 (1996).
105. Federal Rule of Evidence 901 requires the authentication of writings and recordings and lists
several ways in which these items may be authenticated. Included in this list are "testimony of a witness
with knowledge, non-expert handwriting identification, and comparison by an expert." Jill Witkowski,
Note, Can Juries Really Believe What They See? New Foundational Requirements for the Authentication
of Digital Images, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 267, 275 (2002).
106. When evidence is "fungible," drugs or blood samples for instance, courts often require its
proponent to establish a "chain of custody" in the form of testimony or other evidence establishing the
location and condition of the item from the time it was first identified to when it is introduced at trial.
See Mark D. Robins, Evidence at the Electronic Frontier: Introducing E-mail at Trial in Commercial
Litigation, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 219, 233 (2003). Other evidence, such as a serialized
and numbered handgun is "readily identifiable." Id. It can be admitted, for example, by having the
witness who seized it and recorded its serial number testify at trial that the gun being offered is the
same one he seized because the serial numbers match. Id. A tape recording, on the other hand, is a
piece of evidence that is much more susceptible to tampering. Id. The greater the risk there is of the
item being compromised, the greater the need for the proponent to establish a chain of custody. Id.
Generally when courts find defects in the chain of custody they will hold such defects go to weight, not
admissibility. Id. at 234. Under the liberal approach to authentication, the proponent of the evidence
must "only establish that it is reasonably likely that the item was not tampered with or substituted for a
similar item." Id.
107. For a discussion of how these topics interrelate see David W. McMorrow, Authentication and
the Best Evidence Rule Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 195 (1969).
108. The Federal Rules of Evidence broaden both the authentication and best evidence standards
to facilitate the admission of evidence. For example, Rule 902 provides that many documents can "self-
authenticate." Similarly, Article X provides for the admission of original documents, Rules 1002,
1001(3); duplicates, Rules 1003, 1001(4); copies when the original is lost or destroyed, Rule 1004(1);
copies when the original documents can not be obtained by judicial process, Rule 1004(2); copies when
the original is in the opponent's possession, 1004(3). Article X also provides for the admission of public
records, Rule 1005, and summaries of voluminous writings, Rule 1006.
109. Before photocopiers and computers, the best evidence rule was established to decrease the
possibility of misrepresentation or manipulation of writings by requiring the proponent to produce the
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Alternatively, the digital revolution has increased the possibility for fraud
and conscious manipulation of original content.110
Considering both the beneficial and the adverse affects of the com-
puter age, the drafters were prescient in formulating an easy to satisfy stan-
dard for admitting original documents, recordings or photographs.'
Similarly, the drafters made it difficult to even raise a best evidence objec-
tion at trial by requiring opposing counsel to specify what is wrong with the
proof being offered.112 As with authentication, a couple of easy examples
helps demonstrate what the rule actually does.
The first example concerns a criminal case where the accused has con-
fessed to the charges. For our discussion purposes, students are informed
there are no constitutional issues present. The policewoman who took the
accused's statement is on the stand. After a proper foundation has been
laid the prosecutor asks her what the accused said during interrogation.
Defense counsel objects on best evidence grounds, contending that the ac-
cused's written confession is the best evidence of what he said.'" The sec-
ond example is from a civil suit where defendant is a surgeon being sued
for medical malpractice. The doctor's records from before and after the
operation contain the bases for his in-court testimony. After a proper
original document. Sean Allen, Technology and the Best Evidence Rule, 28 PAc. L.J. 834, 835 (1997).
Although the best evidence rule prefers original documents to duplicates, computer-related evidence
such as printouts or data stored within a computer are usually copies of information obtained from
another source. Devin Murphy, Comment, The Discovery of Electronic Data in Litigation: What Practi-
tioners and Their Clients Need to Know, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1825, 1850 (2001). Such computer
related documents will be considered an original if the information documented accurately reflects the
data. Id. Unless there is a genuine issue as to the authenticity of the original or admitting the duplicate
would be unfair, computerized data in duplicate form is admissible. Id.
110. The common law best evidence rule was created to prevent fraud and ensure the accuracy of
written documents. See Andrew M. Grossman, Comment, No, Don't IM Me-Instant Messaging, Au-
thentication, and the Best Evidence Rule, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1309, 1321-22 (2006). In today's
digital world, the rule may have less importance because of modern technology's accurate duplicative
technologies and the inability to camouflage fraud due to expansive discovery processes. Id. On the
other hand, the rule may be even more important because of digital technology's increasing capabilities
to modify electronically stored data. Id.
111. Rule 1001 represents the drafters liberalization of the best evidence doctrine. Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule into the Standard Determining Ad-
missibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough is Enough Even When It Is Not the Best, 50 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 19, 35 (1999). There they expanded the types of writings qualifying as "duplicates," which are
presumptively admissible. Id. Included in the definition of "duplicates" is any document prepared by
reliable mechanical or electronic reproduction means even if the document is produced much later than
the original. Id. Under the common law, duplicates were limited to documents prepared at the same
time as the original. Id.
112. FED. R. Evio. 103(a)(1) (requiring that counsel objecting to the admission of evidence must
make "a timely objection or motion to strike ... stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific
ground was not apparent from the context ..... As applied to best evidence applications, the objecting
party must be able to show some irregularity, error or fraud with respect to the document. See United
States v. Ziesman, 409 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 2005) (evidence admitted where opponent unable to demon-
strate any "question as to the genuineness of the duplication.").
113. See United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707 (1st Cir. 1992) (court found no error in admitting
testimony of what accused stated even though the testimony was allegedly part of a tape recording but
the recording could no longer be found); United States v. Howard, 953 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1992) (court
affirmed admitting a DEA agents testimony even though the original statements were on a recording).
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foundation has been established, defendant's lawyer asks his client to ex-
plain why the operation was not successful. Plaintiff's counsel objects on
best evidence grounds contending that the doctor's records are the best
evidence of what occurred.114
Class conversation now focuses on the semantical problem most stu-
dents have with the best evidence rule: it is not about requiring the best
possible proof to be presented, whatever that might be."' Rather, the best
evidence rule requires the proponent to introduce an original document
when the proponent places that document's contents in issue.' 16 If the pro-
ponent does not refer to the document but only discusses the underlying
events that the document concerns then the contents of the document are
not in question and the best evidence rule does not apply.' 7 It then be-
comes apparent to students why the rule is used so sparingly: any objection
must include the basis for why an original document is required or an ex-
planation as to why the document being offered is unacceptable. Such argu-
ments are rarely available because modern pretrial discovery processes
usually expose defective or fraudulent documents allowing counsel to re-
solve such problems before trial.' Further, when the document itself is
required, Article X's liberal admission philosophy makes duplicates and
other forms of evidence admissible even if the original document had been
destroyed. 119
114. See Cruz v. United States, No. 94 CIV. 6545 (BN), 1998 WL 13839, at *5 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
15, 1998) (because doctor testified that he had no independent recollection of what happened during
the operation in questions, and everything he testified to was based on his medical notes, court held
that doctor's notes were the best evidence of the patient's condition during surgery, what was observed
by the surgeon, and what were the indications and reasons for performing a particular surgical
procedure).
115. Until the Twentieth Century, the best evidence rule was regarded as requiring the best proof
possible under the circumstances. Imwinkelried, supra note 111, at 19-20. Today the rule is universally
understood to apply only when documentary evidence is relied upon as part of the witness's testimony.
Id. at 20.
116. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Proper Procedure in Conducting Scientific Tests: Healing
the Achilles Heel of Forensic Science, 43 No. 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (2007) (consistent with Rule 1002, if a
proponent witness alludes to or if proponent wants to specifically introduce written material, propo-
nent's discussion of the material places its content in issue triggering proponent's obligation to satisfy
the rule).
117. See United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1984) (fact that a bank was federally insured
could be established by witness testimony without resort to documentary evidence).
118. For an excellent discussion of the best evidence rule placed in context with modern pretrial
discovery processes see Edward W. Cleary & John W. Strong, The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation
in Context, 51 IowA L. REV. 825 (1966). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (discussing a litigant's obliga-
tion to produce relevant information prior to trial).
119. Because the evidentiary standards in this area have been significantly reduced from their
common law predecessors, students sometimes question whether the new standards are too lenient and
encourage disreputable attorneys or clients to tamper with or destroy evidence. The literature refers to
such behavior as spoliation - the intentional destruction of evidence or the significant and meaningful
alteration of a document or instrument. James T. Killelea, Note, Spoliation of Evidence, 70 BROOK. L.
REV. 1045, 1048-49 (2005). Spoliated evidence must be "relevant, discoverable, and material to a
party's claim." Id. at 1052. The parties of a suit have a duty to preserve evidence and may be liable
when they fail to do so. Id. at 1049. There is a duty to preserve electronic evidence, but because
electronic information on computers is regularly destroyed in the ordinary course of business, it is
difficult to establish whether such destruction is actually spoliation. Id. at 1050-51.
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B. Category B: Rules 611, 103, 104, 105 and 403 - The "Evidentiary
Mechanics" of Trying a Case
Some rules of evidence are so complex that even the most experienced
trial lawyers and judges must research their application before trial, or if
the issue comes up during trial ask for a recess to ensure proper resolu-
tion.120 Frequent examples are hearsay issues,121 opinion and expert testi-
mony questions,122  questions about privilegesl 23  or character and
credibility evidence issues.124
Category B rules are different. Counsel generally will not have the
luxury of taking a recess to explore how and when an objection or offer of
proof should be made, or under what circumstances an evidentiary instruc-
tion should be requested or prompt an objection.125 The rules in this Cate-
gory are about the constant and ongoing mechanics of trying a case. They
are procedural and directive in nature, and are usually applied with other
more substantive rules. For example, a Rule 403 objection is of no value
unless it is tied to a particular quantum of evidence and the Federal Rule of
Evidence supporting its admission.126
1. Rule 611 - Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation
Before going further into the discussion, students are asked to think
back on their civil procedure course. There they learned that the rules for
120. See FED. R. EvID. 611 (discussing mode and order of interrogation and presentation); FED.
R. EVID 103(a)(1)-(2) (discussing counsel's obligations to make objections and offers of proof); FED. R.
Evio 104(a) (requiring counsel to raise questions of admissibility for the court to determine). Read
together these provisions are the authority for pretrial motions in limine. See United States v. Browne,
829 F.2d 760, 762 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the court's discretion in making definitive rulings on pre-
trial motions).
121. FED. R. EVID., Art. VIII.
122. FED. R. EVID., Art. VII.
123. FED. R. EvID., Art. V; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (holding that
Congress, through the Federal Rules of Evidence, intended federal courts, on a case-by-case basis, to
have flexibility in developing and applying rules of privilege) (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 40891 (1974)
(statement of Rep. Hungate)).
124. See FED. R. EviD., Arts. IV and VI; see also United States v. Sullivan, 803 F.2d 87, 90-91 (3d
Cir. 1986) (relying on Rule 611(b), court held that prosecution could attack defendant's credibility
because defendant placed the issue in evidence when he testified on direct examination).
125. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283 (1989) ("[a] trial judge has the unquestioned power to
refuse to declare a recess at the close of direct testimony-or at any other point in the examination of a
witness.").
126. The classic example of how Rule 403 can be used in applying other rules of evidence can be
seen in admitting proof of other crimes, wrongs or acts pursuant to Rule 404(b).
When deciding if the "other acts" evidence was admissible without reference to Rule 404(b),
we must determine whether such evidence was "intricately related to the facts of the case" at
hand. If we find the evidence is so related, the only limitation on the admission of such evi-
dence is the balancing test required by Rule 403. This test permits the exclusion of relevant
evidence if its prejudicial effect substantially exceeds its probative value.
United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1345 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Hargrove, 929
F.2d 31, 320 (7th Cir. 1991)). See also Doe v. Smith, 470 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2006) (using Rule 403 in
conjunction with Rule 415, in a civil suit for child molestation by officials at the victim's school, to
justify admitting detailed evidence concerning the victim's prior felony convictions).
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how litigation is to proceed from complaint to final appeal must be fol-
lowed irrespective of how good a party's proof may be. The process has
independent value and requirements. If counsel fails to follow the rules,
the case may be dismissed.1 2 7 In many respects, Rule 611 occupies the
same position with respect to how the litigation aspect of the case is to be
conducted. Trial judges are responsible for the "mode and order of interro-
gating witnesses and presenting evidence."1 28  This does not mean the
judge is the functional equivalent of a basketball referee, calling fouls and
counting baskets. The trial judge's role is much more complex.129 The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence require the bench to ensure that the presentation of
evidence supports ascertaining the truth and avoids needless consumption
of time.130 Similarly, the rule requires trial judges to protect witnesses from
harassment and needless embarrassment. 13 1
Similarly, traditional common law trial practice required witnesses
called by a party to testify in their own words. This means the proponent's
lawyer cannot provide the answers to questions in the questions them-
selves.132 We refer to this as the requirement for non-leading questions on
direct examination. 3 3 Alternatively, opposing counsel is allowed to cross-
examine witnesses using leading questions which generally supply the in-
formation counsel seeks the jury to believe. The cross-examiner does not
expect favorable answers to her questions and as a result attempts to limits
the witness's answers, and any potential damage to only a yes or no re-
sponses. We call this leading question cross-examination. The witness's
answers are generally useless to the cross-examiner, while the content, logic
and pace of the cross-examiner's questions tell their own story.1 34 We dis-
cuss how this process works by using the common law bases for Rule 611:
127. When the opportunity presents itself, this is an excellent point to emphasize the professional
responsibility component of adhering to the rules. The obligation is upon counsel to follow evidentiary
and procedural rules. To the extent counsel fail to follow the rules there are serious consequences. See
Christian v. Mattell, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2003) (fining plaintiff's counsel in a copyright infringe-
ment case for inadequate research and questionable advocacy).
128. FED. R. EvID 611(a). Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation.
129. In "Daubert, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that trial judges now h[o]ld 'either
the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform' their [scientific evi-
dence] gatekeeping role." James Aaron George, Offender Profiling and Expert Testimony: Scientifically
Valid or Glorified Results?, 61 VAND. L. REv. 221, 251 (2008) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting).
130. FED. R. EvID. 102. Purpose and Construction.
131. FED. R. EvID. 611(a)(3). Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation.
132. FED. R. EVID. 611(c). Leading Questions.
133. Non-leading questions usually begin with a phrase that invites the witness to explain how,
what, when, or why an event occurred. In effect counsel is asking the witness to describe or explain
something. Leading questions often start with "did you, didn't you, have you, or isn't it a fact that you
[blank]." Such questions usually call for a yes or no answer. Leading questions sometimes do not
appear to be questions at all. For example, they are properly used to establish a foundation by simply
saying: "your name is [blank], and you live at [blank). Isn't that true? See Janeen Kerper, The Art and
Ethics of Direct Examination, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 377, 402 (1998).
134. See Rodney Equi, Master the Rules of Evidence - They are Key to Conveying Your Case, 31-
FALL FAM. ADvoc. 26, 29 (2008) (explaining that cross-examination should be short and concise; the
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witness preparation, pretrial discovery, and the orderly processing of trial
information controlled exclusively by the bench.13 5
2. Rule 103 - Rulings on Evidence
Taken together, Rules 103 and 611 play a larger mechanical role in
trying cases than any of the other Federal Rules of Evidence. This is be-
cause they define responsibilities and practices for what happens in the
courtroom. Philosophically, Rule 103 places greater confidence on trial
lawyers than did the common law. 3 6 Counsel alone are responsible for
calling witness, presenting and objecting to evidence, and making motions.
The rule protects counsel from judicial second guessing and holds counsel
accountable for errors. Rule 611 defines the judge's responsibility for insur-
ing that the process operates appropriately but does not allow the bench to
interfere with counsel's trial tactics. Judges and counsel must be thor-
oughly familiar with these rules because there is not time or opportunity
during trial to research their requirements.
Rule 103 recognizes that few challenging events in life are perfectly
resolved. Trials are among the most complicated of human endeavors and
are rarely, if ever, error-free. Litigation is complex and events happen
quickly - correctly identifying and resolving each error is more aspirational
than realistic.13 7
This provision allows students to see that simply because an eviden-
tiary error occurs does not mean that the injured party will be granted re-
lief on appeal if the trial is ultimately resolved against him. In order to be
successful on appeal, the aggrieved party must demonstrate not only that
cross-examiner should ask simple, leading questions that must be answered by a yes or no: this tech-
nique permits the cross-examiner to control the witness which is a central component to effective
impeachment).
135. See United States v. Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 298 n.13 (5th Cir. 2005) (Advisory Committee's
note to Rule 611 restates obligation of trial judge under the common law as encompassing "such con-
cerns as whether testimony shall be in the form of a free narrative or responses to specific questions, the
order of calling witnesses and presenting evidence, the use of demonstrative evidence, and the many
other questions arising during the coursc of a trial which can be solved only by the judge's common
sense and fairness in view of the particular circumstances.").
136. Rule 103 mandates that counsel make timely and specific trial objections. Latour "LT" Laf-
ferty, Trial Objections: The Way of Advocacy, 11 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 1, 2 (2006). The
effect is to place responsibility for invoking the applicable Federal Rule of Evidence solely on the
litigants. Id. at 3. In this light it can be seen that the trial judge's responsibility is to rule on rather than
raise evidentiary issues. Id.
137. Experience and the literature demonstrate that counsel's aspirations for trying a case should
be competent representation as opposed to seeking perfection, because "the most perfect judicial pro-
cedure is composed of fallible, prejudiced, inadequate, and often mistaken human beings." Derrick
Augustus Carter, A Restatement of Exceptions to the Preservation of Error Requirement in Criminal
Cases, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 947, 981 (1998). As the Supreme Court has stated, "taking into account the
reality of human fallibility of the participants, there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial,
and ... the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09
(1983) (citing Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973)); see also Lutwak v. United States,
344 U.S. 604. 619 (1953) (stating that every man is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one).
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an error occurred, but that the error negatively affected his substantial
rights."' All other errors will be viewed as harmless.1 3 9
Rule 103 provides that errors happen in one of two ways: the trial
judge erroneously admits evidence or erroneously excludes evidence.
However, the focus of this rule is not on what the trial judge does in resolv-
ing evidentiary issues, but on what counsel must do to rectify the error
while still in the trial forum, and then preserve any resulting judicial error
for appeal.1 40 If counsel is offering evidence and the trial judge errone-
ously excludes it, that error will only be preserved for appeal if the propo-
nent makes an "offer of proof" establishing what the excluded evidence
would have been.1' Without this offer of proof it would be impossible for
appellate courts to know what impact the excluded evidence might have
had on the trial process and whether that impact negatively affected the
aggrieved party's substantial rights.
The rule provides similar obligations for counsel opposing the admis-
sion of evidence. Unless the opponent makes a timely and specific objec-
tion to the proffer, any error the trial judge makes in admitting the
evidence will be viewed by an appellate court as having been waived.14 2
Ideally objections occur before the damaging evidence is elicited. The ob-
jection should be specific enough so that opposing counsel can address it,
the trial judge can rule on it, and the reviewing court can evaluate what
occurred below.14 3
At this point in the discussion it is not unusual for students to view
trials as overly formalistic, insensitive to the client's best interests, and the
entire process being caught-up in its own self-importance. Someone will
ask, "What happens if counsel has failed to object or failed to make an
138. Some errors are so severe that courts will view them as automatically requiring reversal. In
United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1444 (9th Cir. 1996), the court reversed appellant's money
laundering and illegal goods importation convictions because, over defense objection, the trial judge
allowed the jury to take into deliberation 14 tapes that had not been played in the courtroom and a tape
player to listen to them. The court found this error to be "structural" and "requiring automatic rever-
sal." Id. at 1445.
139. In Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted), a race discrimina-
tion case, the court set out the standard for evaluating harmless errors:
[T]he harmless error standard we apply in civil cases must be consistent with the standard we
apply to nonconstitutional errors in criminal cases: "we must reverse ... unless it is more
probable than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict." The party benefitting
from the error has the burden of persuasion, and "in cases of 'equipoise,' we reverse ... "
Thus, when reviewing the effect of erroneous evidentiary rulings, we will begin with a pre-
sumption of prejudice. That presumption can be rebutted by a showing that it is more proba-
ble than not that the jury would have reached the same verdict even if the evidence had been
admitted.
140. In order for an appellate court to determine whether reversible error occurred, Federal Rule
of Evidence 103 requires that both the parties and the trial court create a sufficient record of what
happened during the trial. Dinah S. Leventhal, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis,
and Critique, 54 MD. L. REV. 1114, 1116-17 (1995).
141. See generally FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(2). Offer of Proof.
142. See generally FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1). Objection.
143. In United States v. Carpenter, 494 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2007), defense counsel's in limine and trial
objections to evidence were sufficient to preserve allegations of error concerning statements made by
the prosecutor during closing argument about the objected to evidence.
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offer of proof that would have preserved a harmful error for appellate in-
tervention?" Does that mean that an innocent man could go to jail because
of some technicality? Students rail at the thought that trial errors may not
result in appellate relief, particularly in criminal cases. This question of
course creates the perfect vehicle for discussing plain error and the realities
of litigation Rule 103 was meant to deal with.14 4
It is now possible to focus on the student frustration that brought us to
this point - what to do about a waived harmful error. Rule 103(d) provides
the answer to this problem by adding another level of analysis to the equa-
tion and asking - how bad is the waived error? If the error calls into ques-
tion the fairness of the judicial proceeding and the public reputation of the
court, if counsel's failures are tantamount to incompetent representation
then allowing the trial result to stand cannot be tolerated. 145 Under such
circumstances the reviewing court is likely to find that plain error occurred
and grant appellate relief.1 46  In many ways, Rule 103(d) is the drafters'
way of protecting the client from his own attorney. 147
3. Rule 105 - Limited Admissibility
Rules 105148 and 103 have a great deal in common. Both recognize
counsel's responsibility for making tactical trial decisions. Both recognize
that counsel can waive certain trial rights by failure to request them, and
144. See generally FED. R. EVID 103(d). Plain Error.
145. In United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982), the Court dealt with the propriety of
appellant's life sentence. At trial, defense counsel did not challenge the trial judge's defective jury
instructions. Id. at 162. Although the Court found that appellant failed to meet the standard for relief
under these circumstances, the holding is helpful in understanding the circumstances justifying plain
error:
Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the court." [The plain error standard] was intended to afford a
means for the prompt redress of miscarriages of justice. By its terms, recourse may be had to
the Rule only on appeal from a trial infected with error so "plain" the trial judge and prosecu-
tor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in de-
tecting it. The Rule thus reflects a careful balancing of our need to encourage all trial
participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against our insistence that
obvious injustice be promptly redressed.
Id. at 163.
146. In United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2007), the court set out the basic standard
for applying plain error:
As [defendant] did not object to the admission of the 911 recording or transcript, we review
his challenge for plain error only, and will reverse only if he demonstrates that (i) there was
error; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error affected [his] substantial rights by altering
the outcome of the trial. . . [Defendant's] argument fails, since he can show neither that there
was error, nor if there were an error, that it was obvious."
147. See United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116. 1123 (2d Cir. 1995):
[A] manifest pre-trial concern to guard against unfair prejudice through one type of "irrele-
vant evidence" strongly suggests to us that [defendant's] trial lawyer did not simply fall asleep
at the wheel when another type of "irrelevant evidence" was presented at trial. Indeed, given
the sheer quantity of unchallenged yet allegedly prejudicial testimony of this latter sort that is
in the trial record, [defendant's] lawyer would have had to have suffered from aggravated
narcolepsy for us to believe that his failure to object did not reflect a clear and conscious
tactical decision.
148. FED. R. EVID. 105. Limited Admissibility.
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both recognize that responsibility for making these decisions rests entirely
on counsel and not at all on the bench.
This provision is based on the idea that evidence can be admitted for
several reasons, some appropriate and some inappropriate. If the jury is
not instructed on how to use the evidence there is a great chance they will
use it for an inappropriate reason. Rule 105 places responsibility upon
counsel to request an instruction explaining how the jury should appropri-
ately use such evidence. The rule provides that generally there is no obli-
gation on the trial judge's part to ask counsel if an instruction is
requested.14 9 Consistent with Rule 103, if counsel fails to request an in-
struction none is given, and counsel on appeal cannot claim that the bench
should have given the instruction sua sponte. 5 0
A great deal of trial strategy and philosophy goes into using this
rule.15 1 Instructions play a powerful role in how juries interpret and use
evidence during their deliberations.152 However, this reality turns out to be
a two-edged sword. If the evidence can be used for an appropriate or inap-
propriate purpose and no instruction is given the jury may use it for the
wrong reason. The jury may also use it for the wrong reason even if an
instruction is given. However, if counsel requests an instruction and the
instruction tells the jury they are not to use the evidence for an inappropri-
ate. reason the instruction itself may highlight for the jury the importance of
the inappropriate reason, the very evil counsel is trying to avoid.15 ' An
149. For a discussion of how Rule 609 should be interpreted, see United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d
1449 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1164 (1996) (addressing the Supreme Court's
guidance on how the Federal Rules of Evidence should be used and its effective displacement of pre-
existing contrary common law).
150. See Rhodes, 62 F.3d at 1453 ("Rule 105 clearly places upon defense counsel the burden of
requesting an instruction limiting the use to which the jury may put [such] evidence . . . .") (quoting
United States v. Brauner, 32 F.3d 602, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); United States v. Johnson, 46 F.3d 1166,
1171 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding no error at trial in failing to give a limiting instruction as none was
requested by defense counsel).
151. For example, counsel may refrain from requesting a limiting instruction under Rule 105, be-
cause such an instruction may emphasize potentially damaging evidence. Michael H. Graham, Evi-
dence and Trial Advocacy: Advanced Workshop, 41 No. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (2005).
152. Defense counsel may wish to use Rule 105 when, for example, the bench admits extrinsic
offense evidence against her client pursuant to Rule 404(b). Defense counsel may then ask the judge to
instruct the jury to use the admitted proof only for a purpose set out in the rule and not for the purpose
of proving that her client has the propensity to commit crimes. David P. Leonard, The Legacy of Old
Chief and the Definition of Relevant Evidence: Implications for Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 36 Sw.
U. L. REV. 819, 828 (2008) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)). Similarly,
in sex crime cases, defense counsel can ask the judge to instruct the jury that, when a witness or party
uses the term "victim," the term does not indicate the defendant's guilt or the witnesses' truthfulness,
but rather, the term is only a means of reducing confusion and that the jury's role is to "judge the
believability of a witness and determine the weight to be given to the testimony," as well as to "consider
any evidence presented which may have a reasonable tendency to prove or disprove the truthfulness of
the witness." Scott A. McDonald, Comment, When a Victim's a Victim: Making Reference to Victims
and Sex-Crime Prosecution, 6 NEV. L.J. 248, 270 (2005).
153. See FED. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 3.05 Impeachment of Defendant-Convictions (7th Cir. 1999),
for an example of this possibility:
You have heard evidence that the defendant has been convicted of a crime. You may consider
this evidence only in deciding whether the defendant's testimony is truthful in whole, in part,
or not at all. You may not consider it for any other purpose. A conviction of another crime is
not evidence of the defendant's guilt of any crime for which the defendant is now charged.
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example may be the best way to demonstrate the importance of jury in-
structions and counsel's responsibilities for determining whether or not to
request them.
A little further into the portrait and mosaic regime discussion we will
come to character and credibility evidence. At that time, we will discuss
how evidence of previous convictions may be used at trial. 154 For our pur-
poses we can identify two major premises. Let's assume the accused has a
previous conviction for the same crime he is on trial for. Evidence of that
prior conviction is admissible if the accused takes the stand and testifies on
the merits but only for the purpose of impeaching his credibility - that is, to
show that a person who has committed a crime is less likely to tell the truth
than someone who has not committed a crime.' 55 The conviction cannot be
used for the purpose of showing that the accused is a bad man or has a
propensity to commit crimes. If defense counsel does not request a limiting
instruction, there is a great chance that the jury will use the conviction for
the prohibited purpose. However, if defense counsel asks for the instruc-
tion, it may highlight and reinforce the inappropriate use. As a result, de-
fense counsel often prefer to deal with the issue during closing argument or
even during direct examination of his client. If defense counsel selects this
option, it is important to keep in mind that failure to request the instruc-
tion waives the issue for appeal. 156
4. Rule 104 - Preliminary Questions
Initially, Rule 104 (a) and (b) appear to be simply common sense.157
They divide decision-making responsibilities between judges and jurors in
the only way possible. Judges decide questions of law and juries decide
questions of fact. Again, a couple of examples help illustrate the point.
If the question at trial is whether the accused's wife can testify against
the accused, or whether her testimony is protected by the spousal privilege,
it would be inappropriate for jurors to hear the evidence and then decide
See also Leonard, supra note 152, at 827-28 (2008) (discussing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.
681, 691-92 (1988), and the application of Rule 105).
154. Discussing Rule 609 here can be confusing to students. Care is taken to broach the topic only
as a foundation for implementing Rule 105. See United States v. Prawl, 168 F.3d 622 (2d Cir. 1999)
(addressing the obligation to give an instruction when it is properly requested).
155. See United States v. Headbird, 461 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2006). In this felony firearms posses-
sion case, where credibility was the central issue, the court held that: "[O]ne who has transgressed
society's norms by committing a felony conviction is less likely than most to be deterred from lying
under oath." Id. at 1078 (quoting United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir. 2005)).
156. See Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited Admissibility, and Rule 703, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1229. 1235-36 (2007) (suggesting that a judge may give limiting instructions sua sponte, but the
judge may also consult counsel "who may forego the cure because it is worse than the disease" even
though such an omission may result in a waiver of the issue upon appeal and stating that there is a lack
of empirical support indicating that juries can "take the judge's cautionary words to heart and try their
best to keep the evidence in harness.") (citing 21A Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 5066, at 343-44 (2d ed. 2005)). But see Gash, supra note 45, at 1222
(suggesting that the bench should sua sponte instruct under these circumstances).
157. See FED. R. EVID. 104. Preliminary Questions.
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whether the privilege applies."'8 They obviously do not have the legal ex-
pertise to resolve the question, and once they hear the testimony, even if
they later exclude it, experience demonstrates they could not ignore it on
findings. 159
This provision is generally used in conjunction with Rules 103 and 105.
Evidence admissibility and jury instruction questions can only be resolved
by the trial judge. Rule 104 contemplates a timing component to this pre-
liminary legal question litigation. As part of pretrial preparation, the law-
yers should have identified all significant evidentiary issues that are likely
to be raised during trial. The goal of Rule 104 is to resolve those prelimi-
nary questions before trial begins so that the jury's fact-finding process is
not needlessly interrupted by sidebar or out-of-court hearings.160 At this
stage, motions in limine are briefly mentioned as the pretrial vehicle coun-
sel will use to raise such issues.161
5. Rule 403 - Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time
This provision is one of the most significant and most frequently cited
Federal Rules of Evidence.162 It can be used with virtually every other
rule, but has no legal significance if used alone. It is important to tell stu-
dents here that Rule 403 is a legal relevance standard and Rule 401 is a
factual relevance standard. Evidence must satisfy both requirements to be
admissible.
Rule 403's most significant characteristic is that it can be used to ex-
clude otherwise admissible evidence. However, it cannot be used to admit
otherwise inadmissible evidence. For example, if a statement is inadmissi-
ble hearsay, Rule 403 cannot be used to justify its admission. Alternatively,
if the statement is admissible hearsay, but its use would unfairly prejudice
one of the parties, Rule 403 can be used to suppress it.
On the first day of class this logic is counterintuitive and confusing.
Mechanically going through the rule and recalling the evidentiary process
we discussed in Category A helps students understand. We start by looking
at Rule 403. It provides that proof which is otherwise relevant, presented
by a competent witness, authentic, and does not violate either hearsay or
best evidence requirements, can still be excluded if its probative value is
158. Although privileges are beyond the scope of this discussion, they occupy a very important
part of an evidence course. The place to begin any conversation in this area resides with FED. R. EVID.
501. General Rule.
159. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges - Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge Criti-
cally Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony without Invading the Jury's Province to Evaluate the
Credibility and Weight of the Testimony, 84 MARo. L. REV. 1, 28 (2000).
160. See FED. R. EVID. 104(c). Hearing of Jury.
161. Motions in limine are generally used as part of pretrial litigation to narrow the issues and to
determine whether certain evidence may be admissible. Robert C. Zack & Marc L. Newman, Ob-
taining the Upper Hand with Motions in Limine, 76 MICH. B.J. 330, 330 (1997). For example, motions in
limine are used to exclude evidence that a party believes is irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial. Id.
162. FED. R. EVID. 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or
Waste of Time.
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substantially outweighed by any of the following dangers: (1) unfair
prejudice, (2) confusion of important issues, (3) misleading the jury, (4)
undue delay, (5) wasteful of the court's time, or (6) presentation of need-
lessly cumulative evidence.163 The first three of these criteria focus on con-
cerns that affect the jury's ability to decide the case, and the last three,
which overlap each other to some extent, focus on the trial process itself.
The most interesting aspect of Rule 403 concerns number (1) above,
unfair prejudice. This aspect of the rule can be used to exclude evidence
because it is too good, too relevant, too effective, or too prejudicial. Both
the common law and the Federal Rules recognize that such proof is inad-
missible because of its ability to insight the jury's passions which ultimately
could cause them to decide the case on emotional rather than factual
grounds.164
An example helps makes the point. Students are asked to consider a
murder trial and the government's need to establish how death occurred.
The pathologist who conducted the autopsy is testifying. After laying a
proper foundation, the prosecution asks permission to use a videotape of
the pathologist's examination to help the pathologist explain his results
and, as a consequence, help the jury understand how the fatal blow was
struck and how it caused death. Defense counsel objects to the govern-
ment's use of the videotape because it would inflame the jury's passions.165
Defense counsel suggests that black and white photos would make the
same points without the emotional content and resulting dangers. The gov-
ernment's evidence is admissible for all the reasons discussed in Category
A, but the trial judge might still exclude it and require a less emotional
form of proof because the videotape's admission will likely inflame the ju-
rors' passions which would unfairly prejudice the accused. 1 66
While it is important to avoid too much detail at this point, it should
be stressed that the focus of Rule 403's ability to exclude otherwise admis-
sible evidence resides in the word "unfairly," not in the word "prejudice."
Students should see from the beginning that if evidence does not prejudice
163. Id.
164. Although too detailed a conversation to have with students at this early point in the course, it
is interesting to note that Rule 403 is applied differently in cases tried to a jury and those tried before a
judge alone. In Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1994), a personal injury case tried to a
judge alone, evidence detrimental to the plaintiff's case was excluded. Reversing judgment, the court
held that excluding unfairly prejudicial testimony in bench trials is a "useless procedure" because trial
judges are capable of properly identifying and evaluating inadmissible proof. Id. (quoting Gulf States
Utils. Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981)).
165. It is sometimes illuminating to inject a common law case into the discussion as a way of
demonstrating continuity in the development of evidence law. This is particularly true in Rule 403
where the logic for excluding otherwise admissible evidence can be counterintuitive. Rivers v. United
States, 270 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1959) is such a case. The court's language there provides perspective:
"If the mere gruesomeness of the evidence were ground[sic] for its exclusion, then it would have to be
said that the more gruesome the crime, the greater the difficulty of the prosecution in proving its case."
166. See United States v. Merino-Balderrama, 146 F.3d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
district court erred when it allowed the jury to view more than ten minutes of one of the child porn
films found in the defendant's possession when it would have been just as effective, and much less
prejudicial, to show the jury the covers of the films).
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an opponent it is not relevant and thus inadmissible under Rule 401.167
Rule 403 would play no role under those circumstances. Rule 403 ad-
dresses the issue of whether otherwise admissible evidence prejudices the
opponent so much that its admission would be unfair.168 It is this balance
between probative value and unfair prejudice that counsel and judges re-
solve on a case by-case-basis.169 There is no silver bullet resolution and no
mathematical formula. Although evidence is an upper level course at most
law schools, and students have gone through the process of learning that
unlike math, the law provides methods for resolving problems not precise
formulas which produce answers, Rule 403 presents a significant challenge
to their developing skills. Because Rule 403 is both powerful and ubiqui-
tous, overstating its ability to exclude otherwise admissible evidence is al-
ways present.170 The more salient point for students to see is that the rule
was drafted with a presumption of admissibility built in and that in close
cases trial judges will generally admit the questioned proof.171 This is so
even in cases where the probative and prejudicial values are both very
high.172
C. Category C: Rules 102, 401, 403, 601, 702, 801, 901 1002 -
An "Evidentiary Preference" for Greater Admissibility
The federal drafters believed there was a correlation between the
amount of admissible evidence reaching the jury and the accuracy of the
167. The important connection between Rules 401and 403 is made in Ballou v. Henri Studios, 656
F.2d 1147, 1155 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981):
"[U]nfair prejudice" as used in Rule 403 is not to be equated with testimony simply adverse to
the opposing party. Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material. The prejudice must
be "unfair." Unfair prejudice within the context of Rule 403 "means an undue tendency to
suggest (a) decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one." (citations omitted).
168. In United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2008), defendant appealed his conviction for
sexually assaulting two women, claiming that testimony of similar acts against other victims was im-
properly admitted because the district court excluded other similar testimony. Affirming the accused's
conviction, the court held that, the district court properly employed Rule 403 in determining which
previous acts were admissible under Rule 413. Id.
169. Rather than use Rule 403 as a general exclusionary rule, which would effectively abrogate
Rule 402, trial judges must evaluate specific pieces of evidence in an ad hoc manner and assess the
probative value and incidental probative dangers on a case by case basis. Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Impoverishing the Trier of Fact: Excluding the Proponent's Expert Testimony Due to the Opponent's
Inability to Afford Rebuttal Evidence, 40 CONN. L. REv. 317, 351-52 (2007).
170. See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1117 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that Rule
403's balance should be struck in favor of admissibility) (citing United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583,
585 (11th Cir. 1987)).
171. An excellent discussion of this is contained in United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir.
1995). There the court held that Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly. Id. at 1302
(quoting United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1987)). The court went on to say that
opposing counsel's burden is a heavy one. Id. The opponent must show not only that if the challenged
evidence is admitted the danger of prejudice will outweigh its probative value, he must prove it "sub-
stantially" outweighs its probative value. Id.
172. See United States v. Krenzelok, 874 F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that Rule 403
requires admission where the balance is even).
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jury's verdict.1 73 The more evidence admitted, the more accurate the reso-
lution. This philosophy is a significant departure from the common law
which sought to protect jurors from marginally reliable or highly emotional
proof.1 7 4 Common law judges believed jurors would either misuse such
proof or be psychologically overwhelmed by it.175
The Category C mosaic is designed to accomplish three goals: first,
highlight those rules which facilitate the drafter's intent; second, expose the
broad philosophical perspective federal courts use in evaluating evidentiary
questions;17 6 and third, demonstrate that broadening the admissibility stan-
dards by allowing more evidence to be admitted ultimately results in plac-
ing greater responsibility on judges and counsel to ensure that only reliable
and helpful proof reaches the jury, and placing greater confidence in jurors
to properly use that evidence. 77
1. Rule 102 - Purpose and Construction
This provision is included in Category C because it suggests both a
flexible and a liberal approach to using the rules of evidence. 7 Rule 102 is
also the federal drafters' aspirational statement about how the rules should
be applied.' 7 9 Two primary goals emerge from our initial look at the draft-
ers' intent. First, the Federal Rules of Evidence were designed to assist in
173. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 413, 457 (1989) (explaining that the Federal Rules of Evidence were intentionally designed to
be flexible and allow for discretion, as opposed to drafting rigid and detailed rules).
174. In contrast to the common law, the Federal Rules of Evidence promote the truth by accom-
modating "the unique emotional aura of the trial, the jurors' intelligence, and the ... parties, who
frequently bring to court the prejudicial baggage of their lives" and by allowing the trial judge to assess
the total prejudice of the evidence being offered in comparison to the evidence's reliability and proba-
tive value. Id. at 460.
175. For example, at common law, courts tended to shield jurors from expert testimony because it
was deemed inherently biased and "unreliable," since the expert had not personally observed the
events in question. L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witnesses Under Rules 703 and 803(4) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff, 72 INo. L.J. 939, 984-985 (1997).
176. The basic philosophical provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence is embodied in Rule 102.
David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 937, 958 (1990). It
reflects the drafter's most fundamental purposes for creating the rules. Id. In particular, Rule 102
states four principles that the trial court must seek to satisfy in its implementation of the rules: (1) the
ascertainment of truth, (2) achievement of justice, (3) fairness, and (4) avoidance of undue cost and
delay. Id.
177. To be admissible, "both opinion evidence and hearsay evidence must be reliable." Jack
London, Issues of Trustworthiness and Reliability of Evidence from NTSB Investigations in Third Party
Liability Proceedings, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 39, 54 (2003). Because it is virtually impossible to fully
control how jurors use evidence to reach a decision, "[i]n order to guarantee fair and reliable verdicts
... [w]e prevent the jury from receiving evidence that experience suggests may be unreliable." John C.
Sheldon, Thinking Outside the Box about Pro Se Litigation, 23 ME. BJ. 90, 91-92 (2008).
178. This provision will remind students of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
179. The drafters added Rule 102 "to insure[sic] that the [Federal] Rules [of Evidence would be]
liberally, not strictly, construed. Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 1307, 1328-29 (1992) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 102 Advisory
committee's note). Professor Weissneberger suggests that the drafters intended the Rules to operate as
"broad guidance for the resolution of evidentiary issues leaving specific applications to the discretion of
the trial judge." Id. at 1329.
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discovering the truth, and second the rules create a system and process for
justly concluding legal proceedings.s 0
On its own, Rule 102 provides no basis for relief or attaining those
goals. There is no argument that a certain piece of evidence must be admit-
ted or excluded due solely to Rule 102.181 In light of our initial class con-
versations, all the requirements contained in Category A must be met
before any appeal to truth and justice will be appropriate. Viewed in that
context, Rule 102 is more of a make-weight than an independent basis for
relief.182
However, courts have used Rule 102 in conjunction with other rules as
a basis for dealing with unique procedural problems. For example, on oc-
casion, a strict interpretation of an evidentiary provision may lead to an
inappropriate result,183 or a procedure not contained in the rules is needed
to deal with a situation not anticipated by the drafters. 18 4 In both cases,
Rule 102 provides the trial judge with flexibility to fashion an appropriate
remedy. In effect, Rule 102 is a tool for "construing" the rules of evidence,
not ignoring or rewriting them.' It can be effectively used by both propo-
nents and opponents, by defense counsel, as well as by prosecutors and
plaintiffs' lawyers.
2. Rule 401 - Definition of Relevant Evidence
At this point in the conversation, it is always interesting to see if stu-
dents have become familiar enough with the general concepts discussed so
far to answer some basic philosophical questions. For example, "if you
were part of the committee drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence and you
wanted to increase the amount of evidence reaching juries, what concept
180. In Eileen A. Scallen & Andrew E. Tasliz, Reading the Federal Rule of Evidence Realistically:
A Response to Professor Imwinkelreid, 75 OR. L. REV. 429 (1996), the authors discuss an approach to
the Rules of Evidence designed to reach a just trial result whether the rule in question can be literally
applied or whether its legislative history needs to be considered for the proper interpretation and
application.
181. See Mengler, supra note 173 (discussing Rule 102's value in providing general guidance to
judges and lawyers, but that it is of little value in resolving evidentiary questions).
182. During our discussion of Category A we looked at Rule 807 as the drafters' vehicle for al-
lowing the law of hearsay to develop. The drafters realized they could not anticipate all hearsay pos-
sibilities. In many ways, Rule 102 occupies a similar position but with respect the evidence code in
general. Its ultimate impact may be to reject the common law philosophy all laws and rules inconsistent
with the common law are to be strictly construed.
183. See Costantino v. Herzog, 203 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2000) (admitting a videotape of an
operation as a learned treatise notwithstanding that it may have violated Rule 803(18) the hearsay
exception for learned treatises because providing this evidence to the jury was consistent with ascertain-
ing the truth).
184. See United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977) (creating an evidentiary procedure
to deal with inconsistent statements).
185. In United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992), the Court defined "similar motive" for
the admissibility of prior testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) holding that because Congress provided a
broad array of hearsay exceptions, they must have made many considered decisions about what hearsay
evidence may be admitted and what hearsay evidence must be excluded. The Court went on to say that
it did not have the power to create or modify those decisions rather, its power was to enforce Con-
gress's decisions. Id.
2010] 117
118 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 29:83
would you begin with? It is a great relief when students go directly to
relevance. 186
Although in most situations the relevance of a piece of evidence will
be clear and not challenged by opposing counsel, there are times when that
will obviously not be the case.' This dichotomy is a good place to intro-
duce the differences between direct and circumstantial evidence.' Direct
evidence is rarely going to present a problem. The only question such evi-
dence must answer is does it relate directly to an issue in dispute. If a
witness to a murder prosecution says he saw the accused shoot the victim,
such evidence directly relates to an issue at trial and is clearly admissible.
Inferences and questions of interpretation are not presented. However, if
the proof relates to the kind of gun that was used in the crime and there is
evidence the accused owns such a gun, then the bench must determine
whether proof of ownership makes a disputed fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. 189
Rule 401 philosophically balances these considerations by admitting
"evidence having any tendency" to meaningfully affect a matter of conse-
quence. "Any tendency" is a remarkably broad standard adopting a logical
approach to relevance and as a result encouraging judges to admit more
rather than less proof.190
186. "Conjugating" relevance primarily involves three rules: Rule 401 - proof having any ten-
dency to affect a consequential fact making it more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; Rule 402 - evidence which is irrelevant is inadmissible; Rule 403 - relevant evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, misleading the jury, wasting time, needlessly delaying the proceedings, or presenting cu-
mulative evidence.
187. It is often said that no item of evidence is inherently relevant, and that relevance must be
established in every case. In United States v. Dunn, 805 F.2d 1275, 1282 (6th Cir. 1986), the court held
that: "We recognize, of course, that the trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevancy of
evidence and in passing upon its admissibility under Rule 401, and, therefore, its ruling should be ac-
corded substantial deference in this instance."
188. In MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE, AN INTRODUCTORY PROBLEM APPROACH 17 (2002),
Professor Graham explains the difference between direct and circumstantial proof:
Relevant evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence where
the sole inference which must be made to establish a fact of consequence is the truth of the
matter asserted. Testimony such as "I saw X shoot B," is direct evidence offered to establish a
fact of consequence. Circumstantial evidence involves evidence offered to establish a fact of
consequence where an inference in addition to the truth of the matter asserted need be made.
Thus testimony that X fled the scene would be both direct evidence of flight and circumstan-
tial evidence of the murderous act.
189. In United States v. Rodriguez, 457 F.3d 109, 109 (1st Cir. 2006), the defendant was convicted
of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal he argued that the government had not met its
burden of proof establishing that he did possess a gun. Id. at 118. The court disagreed, distinguishing
between direct evidence of a witness who testified to seeing the defendant holding the gun, and circum-
stantial evidence that the gun in question was found near the area where the witness said he saw the
defendant drop it and evidence that the defendant fled the scene to avoid arrest. Id. at 119. The court
said, as a result, a rational jury could find defendant guilty of the offense charged. Id.
190. Early federal litigation on relevance highlighted how widely the federal drafters had opened
the gate with Rule 401. In United States v. Ives, 609 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1979), the court held that weak,
even remote defense evidence, was relevant and its exclusion was error.
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The federal drafters abandoned the word "materiality" in defining rel-
evance because, at common law, the term had become over-used and sub-
ject to a wide variety of interpretations.' 91 In practice, however, the
differences between relevance and materiality are largely form, not sub-
stance. An objection to relevance today includes the common law concept
of materiality. 192 Proof that would have been "material" at common law is
"of consequence" to the determination of the case under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. As a result, the common law question still remains - does "of
consequence" mean an important issue or any issue? It appears the better
answer is any issue.193
When relevance is challenged, the trial judge has four basic choices to
make concerning admission: (1) exclude the proof; (2) admit the proof; (3)
admit the proof with a limiting instruction if requested by counsel;' 94 or (4)
admit some of the evidence and exclude the rest. The trial judge makes
this decision using a two step process. First, she relies on the proponent to
set out the logical and factual basis for admitting the challenged proof. To
accomplish this objective, the proponent must: (1) describe the challenged
evidence; (2) define its linkage to the consequential issue at bar; and (3)
make the connection between the challenged evidence and the fact to be
proved. Step two requires the proponent to establish a legal foundation for
admission.195 To accomplish this goal counsel should: (1) define how the
challenged evidence complies with the substantive requirements of Rule
401, (2) link his position on Rule 401 compliance to the most recent sup-
portive precedent in the jurisdiction, and (3) establish that the logical and
precedential requirements when combined mandate admission.
191. "The rule uses the phrase 'fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action' to
describe the kind of fact to which proof may properly be directed. The language is that of California
Evidence Code § 210; it has the advantage of avoiding the loosely used and ambiguous word 'mate-
rial."' Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 216 (1973). See also
Andrew I. Gavil & Katherine I. Funk, Daubert Comes to Washington: Managing Expert Economic
Testimony in Part III Proceedings at the FTC, 20-SPG ANTITRUST 21, 22 (2006) (comparing the Rules of
the Federal Trade Commission to the Federal Rules Evidence and highlighting the fact that unlike the
FTC Rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence, have largely abandoned the term "materiality").
192. Rule 402 provides that all relevant evidence is admissible. To be relevant under Rule 401,
evidence must bear on an element of a charge or defense and have "any tendency" to make a fact of
consequence to the litigation more or less probable. Jessica Murphy, Note, Swiss Cheese That's All
Hole: How Using Reading Material to Prove Criminal Intent Threatens the Propensity Rule, 83 WASH. L.
REV. 317, 322 (2008). As a result, the Federal Rules of Evidence definition of relevance includes the
common law concept of materiality. See id.
193. See Regan Kreitzer LaTesta, Comment, Rape Shield Statutes and the Admissibility of Evi-
dence Tending to Show a Motive to Fabricate, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 489, 508 (1998) (discussing Rule
401's value in determining whether an exception to Rule 412, the federal rape shield law, should be
created).
194. FED. R. EVID. 105. Limited Admissibility.
195. Rule 403 has already been discussed and is not raised here, because the focus is on proving
relevance and not negating the 403 "dangers."
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3. Rule 403 - Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion or Waste of Time
The first point to make about Rule 403 is that, although it provides for
the exclusion of relevant evidence when that evidence's probative value is
substantially outweighed by the enumerated dangers and potential unfair-
ness, exclusion is rare. 96 The courts' application of the rule and the draft-
ers' intent for the rule has caused it to have the opposite effect. 197 Practice
indicates that there is a presumption in favor of admissibility. 98
It is helpful if students see Rule 403 as an extraordinary remedy to be
used only when the danger of abuse is truly overwhelming, and there are
no viable proof alternatives.199 The practicalities of excluding otherwise
relevant evidence are also daunting. Opposing counsel has the burden of
establishing why the evidence should not be admitted.200 At this point, she
has already lost the substantive battle on admissibility and is now left with
only an "it isn't fair" argument. This is hardly a strong position from which
to argue.
Similarly, because Rule 103(a)(1) requires opposing counsel's objec-
tion to be both timely2 01and specific,2 02 a well defined danger or unfairness
196. Like all Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence.
Francis A. Gilligan & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Bringing the "Opening the Door" Theory to a Close: The
Tendency to Overlook the Specific Contradiction Doctrine in Evidence Law, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
807, 815 (2001). Trial judges should sparingly and rarely use Rule 403 to exclude probative evidence.
Id.
197. "The case law recognizes that relevant evidence must sometimes be excluded when it entails
risks ranging from highly emotional proof to evidence which will simply wastes the court's time. Rules
of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 218 (1973). See also Kathryn Cam-
eron Walton, An Exercise in Sound Discretion: Old Chief v. United States, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1053, 1066
(1998) (acknowledging that common law discretionary power to exclude admissible evidence was in-
creased by the Federal Rules of Evidence).
198. See United States v. Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 664 (3d Cir. 2000)
("[A] number of courts have held that Federal Rule 403 creates a presumption of admissibility, and that
district courts may utilize the rule only rarely to cause the exclusion of evidence.") See also United
States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 208 (1st Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that Rule 403 limitations should be
invoked rarely).
199. In United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 126 (2d Cir. 2006), the trial judge allowed gov-
ernment counsel to call former grand jurors to testify about the accused's physical condition when he
appeared before them. However, the trial court excluded testimony concerning the grand jurors' sub-
jective impressions of the defendant's demeanor and appearance. Affirming this interlocutory appeal,
the reviewing court said that only in "extraordinarily compelling circumstances" would a trial judge's
Rule 403 holding be reversed. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir.
1995), the court used the term "extraordinary remedy" in describing the circumstances surrounding
Rule 403's use.
200. In United States v. Brooks, 145 F.3d 446, 454-55 (1st Cir. 1988), the court held that not only
does the opponent have the burden of establishing the evidence's inadmissibility, but the trial judge
must provide an adequate opportunity for both parties to be heard on the issue. The court held that it
was an abuse of discretion to grant a defense motion without hearing the government's position. Id. at
455. The court referred to this "hair-trigger evidentiary determination" by the trial judge as a proce-
dure which precludes "reasoned consideration" of the issues. Id.
201. Timeliness can be an issue in two respects. The first is represented by Jerden v. Amstutz, 430
F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2005). There the court held that defendant's objection to an experts' testimony
made two days after the expert testified was waiver. Id. at 1237. The second aspect is presented in
Feliciano-Hill v. Principi, 439 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2006), where plaintiff failed to challenge a Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs expert witness until moments before the witness testified. Plaintiff had a copy
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must be articulated. 2 0 3 When the rule is enforced in this fashion it provides
the proponent with an excellent opportunity to rebut opposing counsel's
position. Further and more importantly, as previous mentioned, unless the
danger or unfairness argued substantially outweighs the benefits of admis-
sion, trial judges are required by the rule to admit the proof.204 The term
"substantially" has been consistently interpreted in both state and federal
courts as requiring admission in close cases.20 5
Before leaving Rule 403, one final point about the rule's broad impli-
cations for admissibility must be made. This point also highlights the por-
trait and mosaic regime's value. Going back to our Category B discussions,
admission of even the most controversial evidence may still be appropriate
when Rule 105 is applied with Rule 403. Using both provisions together,
the proponent requests that the bench give an instruction designed to iden-
tify the proper purpose for the evidence or provide a cautionary instruction
against an inappropriate use of that evidence.20 6 The result is that the jury
gets the benefit of hearing the proof while minimizing the possibility of
wrongfully using it. 2 07
4. Rule 601 - General Rule of Competency
Rule 601 and Rule 401 have much in common with respect to liberaliz-
ing the amount of evidence reaching finders of fact. As we previously dis-
cussed, Rule 401 creates a relatively easy standard to meet. Proof which
has "any tendency" to affect a consequential fact results in most evidence
of the witness's testimony for five months before trial and failed to raise any objections to it. Id. In
denying plaintiff's objections, the court said that:
Parties have an obligation to object to an expert's testimony in a timely fashion, so that the
expert's proposed testimony can be evaluated with care. [Plaintiff] did not make a timely
motion here and has not offered any reason for her delay. The district court was on firm
ground in refusing her motion as untimely.
The court noted that such "gotcha" exceptions should be considered only in rare circumstances. Id.
(citing Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2003)).
202. See United States v. Eberhart, 467 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir 2006) (objecting on the grounds that
no adequate foundation had been established to admissibility of tape recording held to be inadequate).
203. See United States v. Wilson, 966 F.2d 243, 246 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that an objection on
relevance grounds does not preserve issue for appeal where counsel sought to contest the undue preju-
dicial effect of proof based on Rule 403).
204. See United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001) (excluding otherwise admissi-
ble evidence under Rule 403 should be looked at as an extraordinary remedy to be sparingly used).
205. See Lopez v. State, 200 S.W.3d 246, 252 (Tex. App. 2006) (resolving Rule 403 objections in
close cases should favor admission).
206. In United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995), the court held that even where
admissibility is a close question, the evidence should be admitted subject to a Rule 105 instruction.
Similarly, in United States v. Logan, 717 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1983), the court held that it was error for the
trial judge not to give an instruction on the significance and use of character evidence.
207. There are several fictions regarding jury instructions: (1) "that jurors will obey instructions to
disregard evidence that have heard," (2) "that jurors will follow instructions to use evidence only for
specified purposes," (3) "that jurors will understand instructions traditionally composed of unfamiliar
words in complex sentences, and they will remember them even when the judge does not exercise her
discretion to let the jurors take written instructions to the jury room," (4) "that they will be able to
overcome misleading hints and omissions in instructions," and (5) "that, after learning at the end of the
trial what standards they are to apply, they will be able to apply them accurately to evidence heard long
before." John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IowA L. REV. 1209, 1251 (2006).
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being relevant. Rule 601 creates the same liberal standard for determining
who can be a witness. It provides that "every person is competent to be a
witness .... "208
At common law, various limits were placed on a witness's capacity to
take the stand. Included in this list were spousal incapacities, extreme
youth, extreme age, mental infirmities, senility, bias, conflicts of interests,
religious affiliations or the lack there of, criminal or conspiratorial relation-
ships, drug or alcohol addiction, and even official governmental posi-
tions.209 Rule 601 eliminates all of these disqualifications.21 o It assumes
that jurors will properly evaluate a witness's testimony in light of the wit-
ness's personal limitations.2 1' This result produces a concern for how much
"weight" the jury will give a witness's testimony, not whether the testimony
will be admitted.212
Jurors alone have the responsibility to believe or disbelieve the evi-
dence they hear.213 A witness with obvious financial interests in the out-
come of a case is likely to have his testimony receive less weight from the
jury than a witness who is not involved in or concerned about the litiga-
214tion's financial ramifications.
As with Rule 401, the trial judge is given broad discretion in determin-
ing who is fit to testify at trial. 215  Generally, this responsibility concerns
the judge balancing three related rules of evidence. The first is Rule 403,
208. FED. R. EVID. 601. General Rule of Competency.
209. Under the common law, a witness had to possess perception, memory, narrative ability, and
sincerity because these qualities were viewed as the most fundamental determinants of the reliability of
a witness's testimony. lmwinkelried, supra note 33, at 1053. Moreover, prior to Rule 601, when a
witness had a disability such as infancy, religious belief, criminal convictions, interest in the litigation,
insanity, and adversarial testimony about a decedent, the witness may have been deemed incompetent.
Rule 601: General Rule of Competency, supra note 65, at 477.
210. See FED R. EvID. 603. Oaths or Affirmations; FED. R. EVID. 604. Interpreters; FED. R. EVID.
605. Competency of Judge as Witness; FED. R. EvID. 606. Competency of Juror as Witness; FED. R.
EVID. Art. V. Privileges.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Gates, 10 F.3d 765, 766 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that Rule 601
presumes jurors will evaluate witness testimony in light of that witness's individual circumstances).
212. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, juries can consider proof of a witness's personal attrib-
utes when evaluating the weight and worth of that witness's testimony. Among the most important of
these attributes are: (1) proof of bias or interest, (2) confirmation of a reputation for good or bad
character; (3) conviction of a serious crime, and (4) opinion or reputation concerning propensity for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. Phillip W. Broadhead, Why Bias is Never Collateral: The Impeachment
and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC., 235, 262 (2003). After
considering this type of proof, the jury determines the credibility assigned to each witness and her
testimony. Id. This assessment often decides how the case will be resolved. Id. at 262-63. See also
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Logerquist v. McVey: The Majority's Flawed Procedural Assumptions, 33
ARIZ. ST. L.J, 121, 128 (2001) (discussing the possibility that a jury, after hearing testimony of a witness
indicating whether or not a witness saw an accident and then concluding that the witness did not see the
accident. will disregard the witness's testimony about the accident and attach no weight to the testi-
mony during deliberations).
213. See FED. R. EvID. 104. Preliminary Question; FED. R. EVID. 611. Mode and Order of Inter-
rogation and Presentation.
214. See Tarnowski v. Lieberman. 560 S.E.2d 438, 441 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing credibility
issue as influenced by witnesses financial interests in the trial's outcome).
215. See United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 111 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the trial court did
not err when it ruled on witness competence during trial rather in camera as trial judges have broad
discretion in determining the procedure for resolving such questions).
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which provides that the trial judge has an independent obligation to ensure
that a witness's testimony is not unfairly prejudicial. Second, Rule 603 pro-
hibits a witness from testifying if that witness will not or cannot swear or
affirm that she will tell the truth.216 Finally, those witnesses whose limita-
tions are so severe that they prohibit the witness from having gained per-
sonal knowledge about the events in question should also be excluded.2 17
Drug or alcohol abuse presents typical problems. A witness who may
be an alcoholic but at the time of trial is sober and able to explain what he
saw will nonetheless be permitted to testify.218 Similarly, a witness who
was drunk at the time of the event but is sober at the time of trial will likely
be permitted to testify. 219 Alternatively, a witness who is intoxicated while
on the stand, irrespective of whether he was sober at the time of the event
presents problems that affect more than the weight of his testimony. Such
a witness may be unable to remember or relate the facts he personally ob-
served, he may be impossible to meaningfully cross-examine, and allowing
such a witness to testify constitutes an affront to the search for the truth.220
5. Rule 702 - Testimony by Experts
This provision introduces students to the idea that proof and witnesses
can be divided into two categories. The first is testimony by laymen.22'
Here ordinary witnesses testify about facts they have personal knowledge
of.222 The easy example is a witness who observed the red car run a stop
light just before plowed into the blue car. The second type is opinion testi-
mony by expert witnesses.223 This proof includes a qualified expert's opin-
ion, inferences and conclusions concerning how, for example, the accident
occurred.224 Rule 702 allows experts to offer such testimony when their
scientific or other specialized knowledge is required by the jury to assist
216. FED. R. EVID. 603. Oath or Affirmation.
217. Competence to testify generally involves three specific intellectual abilities: the ability to
accurately observe, remember and then recount the events in question. See United States v. Gutman,
725 F.2d 417, 425 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that an aggrieved party should move for a hearing consistent
with Rule 104(a) to resolve these questions).
218. See United States v. van Meerbeke, 548 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing witness's use of
drugs).
219. See United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding no abuse of discretion to
admit testimony of cocaine addict).
220. See FED. R. EVID. 102; United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1983) (excluding testi-
mony from witness who was drunk on the stand).
221. FED. R. EvID. 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.
222. A clear example of this can be seen in United States v. Durham, 464 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2006).
Affirming the accused's conviction for allowing her 18-month-old daughter to inhale from a smoking
marijuana pipe, the court found that the trial judge did not err by allowing a witness with extensive drug
use experience, who had also smoked from the same pipe, to establish that the pipe contained mari-
juana. Id. at 982-83. The court held that such testimony was admissible because it was based on the
witness's personal knowledge of marijuana's characteristics and not specialized or technical knowledge
controlled by Rule 702. Id.
223. FED. R. EVID. 702. Testimony by Experts.
224. An expert is someone qualified to testify within her range of expertise which is based on her
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Robert F. Schopp, Two-Edged Swords, Danger-
ousness, and Expert Testimony in Capital Sentencing, 30 LAW & PsYCHoL. REV. 57, 91-92 (2006).
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them in unraveling difficult factual questions.225 The easy example associ-
ated with our fact pattern concerns medical experts explaining how plain-
tiff's injuries were caused by the red car running into the blue car.226
Testimony by experts,2 27 like hearsay evidence which we will consider
next,2 2 8 are two major components of the federal drafters' intention to in-
crease the amount of admissible evidence. 229 Both rules are crucial to com-
plex modern federal litigation and often have an outcome determinative
impact on cases. 230 Each of these rules has undergone recent significant
modifications due to Supreme Court guidance.231 Interestingly, although
both rules deal with very different substantive areas of the law, they are
linked by similarly defined requirements for "reliable" testimony.232 The
burden of establishing reliability rests with the evidence's proponent.2 3 3
Perhaps the best definition of and perspective on what is "reliable"
scientific and opinion evidence comes from the legendary but now rejected
polygraph evidence case, Frye v. United States:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
225. Before enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the common law required an expert's
opinion to be based on admissible facts. Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Con-
stitutional Boundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 837 (2008). Experts were then
permitted to apply their specialized knowledge to the particular facts of a case and to testify to an
opinion based upon that process. Id.
226. See George v. Cox L.A. Telecom, LLC, No. Civ. A. 03-2215, 2004 WL 612954, at *1 (E.D.
L.A. Mar. 25, 2004) (plaintiff sued defendant after being injured by a cable defendant negligently left in
her yard; denying defendant's motion in limine to exclude medical expert testimony as to causation).
227. See FED. R. EVID. Art. VII. Opinions and Expert Testimony.
228. See FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII. Hearsay.
229. See Fox v. Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that close questions on
the admissibility of expert testimony should be resolved in favor of allowing juries to hear the
evidence).
230. The evolution of criminal and civil litigation has included greatly increased reliance upon
opinion testimony from expert witnesses. See WARD F. CLARK, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE PROSECU-
TOR's DESKBOOK 542 (Patrick F. Healy & James P. Manak, eds., 1971) (stating that proof admitted
under Article VII has become "the backbone of every circumstantial evidence case.").
231. In Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 781 (Mich. 2004), the court held that
when "this case was tried, the proponent of expert opinion evidence bore the burden of establishing
admissibility according to the Davis-Frye 'general acceptance' standard. MRE 702 has since been
amended explicitly to incorporate Daubert's standards of reliability."
232. Hearsay, unless it falls into an exception or exemption, is considered unreliable and thus
inadmissible because "the opposing party is deprived of the opportunity to test its trustworthiness
whenever the source of the testimony is not produced for examination under oath in front of the fact
finder." Miguel A. Mendez, Expert Testimony and the Opinion Rule: Conforming the Evidence Code to
the Federal Rules, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 412-13 (2003). Similarly, expert testimony is deemed inadmis-
sible "[ulnless the judge is convinced by all the evidence, including the opposing party's, that the expert
opinion is reliable." Id. at 413.
233. As discussed in Mosaic B supra, Rule 702 must be applied with Rule 104(a). See Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (holding that trial judge shall determine whether preliminary
fact established by a preponderance of all the evidence); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568
(1989) (holding that Rule 104(a) does not prohibit the trial judge using in camera review procedures
concerning challenged evidence); FED. R. EVID. 104(b); see also Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d
1397 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that if evidence can be believed jury must be given the opportunity to use
it).
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in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recog-
nized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.234
The battle over how to define reliability and the general acceptance
standard raged for seventy years.235 In many ways the old common law
standard for admissibility, which was not specifically adopted by the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, controlled litigation and was viewed by many as a
significant limitation on expert testimony, novel scientific evidence devel-
opment, and the evolution of federal litigation.236
Frye was abandoned in 1993 when the Supreme Court began reexam-
ining the standards governing scientific evidence and expert opinion testi-
mony2 3 7 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals' Inc. 2 3 8 and its
234. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (excluding systolic blood pressure
deception test, the precursor to our current polygraph evidence, as not being "generally accepted" in
the relevant scientific community).
235. Interestingly, when the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Advisory Committee's Notes on Arti-
cle VII and Rule 702 in particular were originally promulgated, they did not contain a single mention of
Frye or its "general acceptance" standard. "For over seventy years, federal courts required scientific
techniques to be generally accepted among the relevant scientific community before they could be
admitted at trial." Jessica M. Sombat, Note, Latent Justice: Daubert's Impact on the Evaluation of Fin-
gerprint Identification Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2819, 2821 (2002). "This 'general acceptance'
standard ... dominated the debate over how expert scientific witnesses could testify in the courtroom,
even after the introduction of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in 1975." Id.
236. At early common law, the only real limitation on expert testimony was that the witness be a
qualified expert in the field. In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), expert testimony was
stringently limited under the "general acceptance" test. David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80
DENv. U. L. REv. 345, 354-55 (2002). While the Frye test was popular in the 1960s and 1970s, by the
1980s and 1990s, it came under immense scrutiny, and in 1993 the Supreme Court officially rejected it in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579. In Daubert, the Court held that Federal Rules of
Evidence 702 provides the standard for admitting qualified expert testimony. Owen, at 358-59.
237. See William G. Childs, The Overlapping Magisteria of Law and Science: When Litigation and
Science Collide, 85 NEB. L. REV. 643, 650 (2007) (stating that pursuant to Rule 702, an expert's testi-
mony must be scientific and relate to scientific knowledge; trial courts now focus more precisely on the
expert's methodology rather than the acceptance of the expert's general field of work). Id.
238. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. Justice Blackmun opined that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 super-
seded the "general acceptance" standard of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In place
of general acceptance, the Court created a five-part flexible and nondispositive standard. Daubert, 509
U.S. at 595. It provides that in determining reliability the trial court should look at: (1) has the scientific
theory or technique been tested or is it capable of being tested; (2) has the theory or technique been
subjected to peer review or publication: (3) is there a known or knowable error rate for the theory or
technique; (4) are there standards for control and maintenance concerning application of the theory or
technique and (5) to what extent has the theory or technique been generally accepted by the applicable
scientific community? Id. at 593-95.
126 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 29:83
progency. 239 The Court replaced general acceptance with a five part test
derived from the federal rules.240
One of the most interesting aspects of Daubert can be found in Justice
Blackmun's opinion discussing the "gatekeeper" role trial judges have in
ruling on the admissibility of scientific evidence.2 4 1 Justice Blackmun de-
fined this role as ensuring expert witness testimony will flow from scientific
or other specialized knowledge and that the proof is at least minimally
reliable.242
While discussion of these complex standards, the modifications to
Rule 702 and Rule 702 itself, is better left until later in the course, it is
important for students to know that both the federal drafters and the Su-
preme Court have worked to increase the usability and admissibility of sci-
entific evidence and expert opinion testimony.2 4 3 It is also important for
239. Kumho Tire Co.v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 137 (1999), significantly expanded upon and
clarified the Court's previous holding in Daubert, finding that: (a) the Daubert factors apply to the
testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists; (b) Rule 702 and 703 grant all expert
witnesses testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses only when that testimony has a reliable
basis in the knowledge and experience of the witness' discipline; (c) the Daubert factors do not consti-
tute a definitive checklist or test, but should be applied in a flexible manner and only when they consti-
tute a reasonable measure of reliability; (d) among the factors a court should consider in determining
whether to apply the Daubert factors are the nature of the case, the expert's particular expertise, and
the subject of his/her testimony; (e) whether the Daubert factors are reasonable measures of reliability
in a given case is a matter of law for the trial judge to resolve; and (f) trial judges have broad discretion
in making Daubert rulings. In Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 140 (1997), the Court affirmed the
trial judge's decision to exclude plaintiffs' experts' explanative theory testimony because it "did not rise
above 'subjective belief or unsupported speculation."' The Court concluded that nothing in Daubert
requires trial judges to admit opinion testimony "connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert." Id.
240. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95.
241. In Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, Justice Blackmun describes this process in the following terms:
We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevi-
tably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.
That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the
exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal
disputes.
Id. at 597 n.13. He goes on to support this position by.referring to BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 178-79 (1921):
This is not to say that judicial interpretation, as opposed to adjudicative factfinding, does not
share basic characteristics of the scientific endeavor: "The work of a judge is in one sense
enduring and in another ephemeral . . .. In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is
a constant rejection of the dross and a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound and
fine."
242. In Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90, Justice Blackmun states that:
The subject of an expert's testimony must be "scientific ... knowledge." The adjective "scien-
tific" implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word
"knowledge" connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term "ap-
plies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted
as truths on good grounds."
243. In Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1990), the court examined Rule 702 and
its helpfulness standard as applied to expert witness testimony about concerning children's use of emer-
gency elevator buttons. The court held that:
While it is true that one needn't be B.F. Skinner to know that brightly colored objects are
attractive to small children and that covered buttons or those with significant resistance are
more difficult to actuate by little hands, given our liberal federal standard, the trial court was
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students to know that although the Supreme Court has set out new stan-
dards, those changes are currently unsettled and likely to remain so well
into the future.
6. Rule 801 - The Hearsay Rule and Hearsay Exclusions
Hearsay and Article VIII traditionally occupy a large percentage of
class time because of their complexity and pivotal role in litigation. Rule
801 is the most significant Federal hearsay provision as it provides common
definitions for all Article VIII rules.24 It also contains important "exclu-
sions" to the prohibition against hearsay testimony.245
Rule 801 codifies the common law assumption that hearsay is unrelia-
ble because: (1) the original statement was uttered by an out of court de-
clarant, (2) who was not under oath at the time he made the statement, (3)
there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant when the state-
ment was originally made, and (4) this resulted in the jury being unable to
evaluate the declarant's demeanor and credibility at the time the statement
was made.246
Category C's focus is on how the federal drafters used Rule 801 to
increase the amount of evidence reaching finders of fact. Rule 801's defini-
tions for statement,247 declarant, 248 and hearsay itself 49 provide a central-
ized and easier to apply set of criteria than could be found at common law.
The rule also provides that when an out of court statement is offered at
trial for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
Rule 801 excludes it from the definition of hearsay.250 Admissibility under
those circumstances turns on other evidentiary considerations.2 51
Section 801(d) further increased the amount of evidence reaching ju-
rors by redefining what is considered to be hearsay. It made prior state-
ments of witnesses and admissions by party opponents "exclusions" from
and not just "exceptions" to the hearsay prohibition. Rule 801(d) provides
not "manifestly erroneous" in admitting this testimony and its judgment is accordingly
affirmed.
Id. at 212.
244. FED. R. Evio. 801. Definitions. See also John C. O'Brien, The Meanings of Hearsay, 50 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1091, 1092, 1093 (2006) (examining the definitions and applications of Rule 801(a) to
801(c)).
245. FED. R. EVID 801(d). Statements which are not hearsay.
246. In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723 (1968), the Supreme Court discussed the underlying
bases for the prohibition against hearsay by relying in part on two landmark evidence treatises of the
time; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1395-1396, 1404 (3d ed. 1940); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 231, 234
(1954).
247. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
248. FED. R. EVID. 801(b). Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
249. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Hearsay.
250. Under the Federal Rules, in order to have hearsay, there must a determination that there is a
statement or assertion, and that the statement is being offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, some matter that has been asserted out-of-court by the actor or declarant. O'Brien,
supra note 244, at 1095.
251. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion,
or Waste of Time.
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that these statements "are not hearsay. "252 While this change is a marked
semantical difference from the common law, it created very little significant
substantive change. Rule 801(d) categories must still qualify for admission
as they did at common law.253
In many ways, Rule 801's definitions are the interpretative link for
applying the myriad of traditional and non-traditional common law hearsay
exceptions codified in Rules 801(d), 803, 804, and 807.254 Taken together
this hearsay mosaic facilitates admitting out of court statements thereby
increasing the amount of proof available to juries. 2 5 5
Students should also note that codifying the rules of evidence, and
hearsay in particular, facilitated the drafters' objective for admitting more
proof and thereby increasing the accuracy of jury verdicts.256 Codification
created an easy menu of and reference for understanding and using hear-
say. It also helped educate the bar about the complexities of hearsay and
how to effectively deal with them. This resulted in greater attorney and
judge competence which produced improved consistency and predictability
which ultimately led to more proof reaching finders-of-fact.257
Although too complex and involved to cover in any detail here, a short
discussion of the Supreme Court's recent changes to using hearsay evi-
dence in state and federal criminal cases is discussed at this point in the
252. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) increases the amount of evidence reaching the finders of
fact because it designates particular out-of-court statements as not hearsay. O'Brien, supra note 244, at
1095.
253. For example, while the Federal Rule allows for substantive use, prior inconsistent statements
are admissible only if the statement was made under oath at a formal hearing and was subject to cross-
examination at the time it was made. Andrew King-Ries, An Argument for Original Intent: Restoring
801(d) (1) (A) to Protect Domestic Violence Victims in a Post-Crawford World, 27 PACE L. REV. 199, 224
(2007). See also E. Desmond Hogan, Note, A Consistent Interpretation for 801(d) (1)(B) Prior Consis-
tent Statements, 39 How. L.J. 819, 819 (1996) (stating that 801(d)(1)(B) retains the common law tempo-
ral requirement that a witness's prior consistent out-of-court statements are admissible to rebut a
charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, but such statements are only admissible if
they were made before the alleged motive or improper influence existed); Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (holding that before a coconspirator's statement can be admitted under
801(d)(2)(E), there must be evidence that there was a conspiracy between the declarant and the non-
offering party, and that the statement was made "during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.").
254. See Paul S. Milich, Re-Examining Hearsay under the Federal Rules: Some Method for the
Madness, 39 U. Kan. L. Rev. 893, 894 (1991) (discussing the logic behind various hearsay applications).
255. But see Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 502-503 (2006)
(discussing how Crawford overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and held that "testimonial"
out-of-court statements are Constitutionally admissible only if the declarant testified or was unavailable
and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination). Id.
256. See Brooks Holland, Comment, Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence in
New York: The Door Opens Wide, or Just a Crack?, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 195 (2002) (stating
that "[tihe Federal Rules of Evidence have liberalized hearsay rules in favor of broader admission.").
257. Early Federal Rules of Evidence hearsay cases demonstrated the common law's weakness in
educating the bar and sensitizing practitioners to basic evidentiary requirements. For example, in
United States v. Escobar, 674 F.2d 469. 469 (5th Cit. 1982), the court found error in the trial judge
allowing a government witness to identify the accused as a drug dealer because of information con-
tained in a computer summary. Similarly, in United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 421 (2d Cir. 1981),
the court reversed appellant's conviction because a government witness was allowed to testify concern-
ing what an unidentified informer said about the defendant's complicity in the charged offenses. Be-
cause of codification, it is less likely that such blatant errors would occur today.
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course. In Crawford v. Washington2 58 and its progeny,25 9 the Court applied
a much stricter standard for admitting "testimonial evidence" than had
been used for the past 25 years.260
The Crawford series of cases raise enough interesting evidence and
constitutional law questions to justify an entire course. 261' A particularly
interesting issue is whether Crawford has, as many suggest, worked against
the drafters' philosophy of providing more evidence to the finders of fact,
or is the amount of evidence reaching jurors relatively the same, only more
258. In Crawford, 541 U.S. at 70, Justice Scalia stated that when out-of-court statements are "testi-
monial" they are barred by the Constitution's Confrontation Clause unless the declarant testifies, or if
the declarant is unavailable at trial, the accused had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The
Court also said this outcome is required irrespective of whether the statement is seen as being "relia-
ble," thus abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
259. In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) and Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 822
(2006), the Supreme Court elaborated on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, and its use of the terms
"testimonial" and "interrogation." Once again, the Court declined to offer an exhaustive definition but
did provide some clarification. Justice Scalia summarized the Court's reasoning in the two cases:
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements - or
even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation - as either testimonial or
nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows: Statements are non-
testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet
an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
In Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 406 (2007), the Court held that under Roberts, out-of-court
nontestimonial statements not subject to prior cross-examination were inadmissible without a judicial
determination on reliability. Under Crawford they said, the Confrontation Clause has no application to
such statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability. In Giles v.
California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2678 (2008), the court held that the accused's right to confrontation can only
be forfeited by his wrong doing if the prosecution proves that the accused's acts were intended to keep
the witness from testifying at trial. Unless the prosecution can establish the accused's specific intent to
render the witness unavailable for trial, admission of that witness's statements violates Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, and the common law founding-era forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the
confrontation clause. Finally, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2554 (2009), the court
held that "certificates of analysis" (laboratory reports) were testimonial evidence and therefore viola-
tive of the Sixth Amendment and inadmissible when used in a criminal case to demonstrate the ac-
cused's illegal possession of a controlled substance. In a strong dissent Justice Kennedy opined that, the
Court was reversing 90 years of precedent and in so doing creating serious practical and financial chal-
lenges for state governments in prosecuting drug related offenses.
260. See Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the "Ongoing Emergency": A Pragmatic Approach to Hear-
say Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 797 (2008). Professor
Yee explains that under Ohio v. Roberts, the prosecution could use ex parte statements against a crimi-
nal defendant based on a finding of reliability. Id. However, after Crawford v. Washington, the trial
court must determine whether the statement is testimonial, and if so, the declarant must either testify at
trial or have been subjected to cross-examination on a prior opportunity. See also Pamela R. Metzger,
Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 503 (2006).
261. "Crawford . . . like all significant constitutional interpretations . . . has raised as many ques-
tions as it has answered, and almost immediately after the opinion was issued, both courts and legal
academics began wrestling with its implications." Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Con-
frontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & PoL'Y 791, 794-95 (2007). See also Constitu-
tional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 316, 321 (2004) (stating that the Crawford Court's constitutional
analysis raised substantial questions and left them unanswered); Margaret M. O'Neil, Comment, Craw-
ford v. Washington Implications for the War on Terrorism, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1077, 1088-89 (2005)
(stating that the Crawford opinion brought clarity to the requirements for admitting some hearsay but
also failed to address significant questions).
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reliable? 26 2 ThiS second result is possible because while Crawford prohib-
ited "testimonial" hearsay statements from being admitted against an ac-
cused unless the declarant testified at the trial or was subjected to cross-
examination at a previous hearing, the same amount of evidence is still
generally available as prosecutors can obtain the declarant's presence at
trial, or preserve it by deposition.26 3
7. Rule 901 - Requirement of Authentication and Identification
A constant theme of this paper has been that the portrait and mosaic
regime facilitates students' ability to see the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
mutually supportive procedural and substantive evidentiary matrix. In Cat-
egory A we used the regime to show that hearsay and authentication issues
often arise in the same fact-patter. Not surprisingly, students initially have
a difficulty identifying this and then distinguishing between authentication
and hearsay. As we will see next in Category C, the same will be said for
best evidence.264 Similarly, it is not unusual for students to believe that
once authentication has been resolved, hearsay or best evidence have also
been settled. An easy way for students to distinguish these three substan-
tive areas, consistent with our overview, is for them to see hearsay as re-
quiring confrontation, authentication as requiring relevance, and best
evidence as requiring original proof.
Our Category C discussion now focuses on how hearsay and authenti-
cation were used by the federal drafters as vehicles for increasing the
amount of evidence reaching fact finders. Rule 901 is generally the first
authentication provision counsel think of because it deals with physical evi-
dence and written or oral communication2 65  Rule 901 requires that the
proponent's evidence be what the proponent claims it to be.266 in most
instances this means that the proponent must establish a historical connec-
tion between the evidence being offered in court and the events in ques-
tion.2 67  Rule 901 makes this process significantly easier than it was at
common law by providing alternative means for admitting different types
of evidence.268 From the outset, federal courts interpreted Rule 901 as lib-
eralizing the authentication process.269
262. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his Crawford dissent, the Court's decision to overrule a
twenty-five year precedent did not necessarily solve the problem; rather, the Court left the decision of
what is "testimonial" open, leaving the lower courts in the dark on this matter. 541 U.S. at 75-76.
263. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1398 (2005) (stating that as
a result of Crawford, prosecutors have increased reliance on 801(d)(1)(A), which allows impeachment
of accusers with their prior inconsistent statements, thus avoiding the Confrontation Clause barrier).
264. See FED. R. EVID. Art. X.
265. FED. R. Evio. 901(a). General Provision.
266. See, e.g., Olin Guy Wellborn III, Authentication and Identification of Evidence Under Article
IX of the Texas Rules of Evidence, 16 St. Mary's L.J. 371 (1985) (establishing the basis and application
of evidence provisions concerned with authenticating and identifying evidence).
267. FED. R. EvID. 104(b). Relevancy Conditioned on Fact.
268. See FED. R. Evio. 901(b) (listing ten "illustrations" for how to authenticate or identify vari-
ous types of evidence).
269. In United States v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 1977), the court rejected a rigid formula
for authenticating evidence holding that:
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The mosaic within the mosaic here demonstrates that other Rules
must be considered in authenticating or identifying the evidence. For in-
stance, when a lay270 witness is used to authenticate a piece of evidence, the
proponent must establish that the witness will present relevant testi-
mony,27' be competent to testify,272 and have personal knowledge about
the issue in question.273 When an expert witness is used for this purpose,
the proponent must additionally establish the witness's qualifications as an
expert,274 and that the opinion evidence is reliable.275
Rule 104(b) also plays a significant role.276 Without adding too much
complexity at this introductory stage, students will see that the federal
drafters intended authentication to be a jury question. Rule 901 requires
that proponents present enough evidence to support admissibility. As a
result, questions of authenticity fall under Rule 104(b)'s conditional rele-
vancy standard. This means that first the trial judge has to decide if the
proponent has offered enough proof for the jury to find that the evidence is
what it is purported to be, and then the jury decides the factual question of
whether to believe authenticity has been established.277
A common example for discussing authentication and identification is-
sues concerns admitting a piece of physical evidence. Rule 901 incorpo-
rates two common law techniques for accomplishing this. The first is
generally used when the evidence is "readily identifiable." For example, if
the item sought to be admitted is a gun with an embedded serial number on
varying circumstances of particular cases in which one or another aspect of this problem [au-
thenticating a tape recorded conversation] may present itself militate against our adoption of
inflexible criteria applicable to all cases . . . since recorded evidence is likely to have a strong
impression upon a jury and is susceptible to alteration, we have adopted a general standard,
namely, that the government 'produce clear and convincing evidence of authenticity and accu-
racy' as a foundation for the admission of such recordings.
270. See FED. R. EVID. 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.
271. See FED. R. EviD. 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence."
272. See FED. R. EvID. 601. General Rule of Competency.
273. See FED. R. EVID. 602. Lack of Personal Knowledge.
274. See United States v. Frabizio, 445 F. Supp. 2d 152, 170 (D. Mass. 2006) (granting the defen-
dant's motion to exclude the prosecution's proffered expert testimony as to whether images of alleged
child pornography found in the defendant's possession were images of real children because the expert
was not qualified to make such a determination).
275. See FED. R. EvID. 702. See also Ahlberg v. Chrysler Corp., 481 F.3d 630, 635-36 (8th Cir.
2007) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit expert testimony
when the opinion evidence was unreliable as the proffered expert employed no methodology whatso-
ever in reaching his conclusion).
276. As authentication is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence, Federal Rule of
Evidence 901(a) indicates that authentication is a Rule 104(b) question of conditional relevancy and
requires the introduction of evidence which is sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims. Gerald F. Uelmen, Conditional Relevance and the Admission of Party
Admissions, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 657, 661 (2008).
277. When a document is offered into evidence, the document is only relevant if it is what the
proponent claims it to be. Mark D. Robins, Evidence at the Electronic Frontier: Introducing E-mail at
Trial in Commercial Litigation, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 219, 225 (2003). Rule 104(b)
requires the proponent to provide enough evidence that a jury could reasonably conclude that the
fulfillment of this condition is establish. In other words, the judge will only exclude the document if
there is no evidence from which the jury could make this conclusion. Id. Any "[fllaws in the proof of a
document's authenticity go to the weight that the jury gives that document in assessing the evidence
rather than to the document's admissibility." Id.
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the stock, and that number was recorded at the crime scene, and can later
be verified in court when the gun is offered into evidence, then the propo-
nent has established that the proffered gun is the same one obtained from
the crime scene.278
If the item is a sample of marijuana there are no readily identifiable
characteristics which can be used to establish that the sample being offered
in court is the same sample that was seized from the accused. The propo-
nent here will use a chain of custody to prove that from the time the drugs
were seized, through the period when they were analyzed at a laboratory,
and ultimately offered in court that: (1) they are the same sample that was
taken from the accused and (2) during the intervening period between
seizure and proffer at trial, the sample was not changed or altered in any
meaningful way.279
8. Rule 1002 - Requirement of Original
As discussed in Category A, the best evidence rule requires that when
the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph are in issue the propo-
nent must produce the original unless another rule provides an excep-
tion.2 8 0 The value of Rule 1002 and Article X in general has been largely
overcome by technology and the movement toward improved discovery.28 1
Today, endless exact copies of the evidence addressed in this provision can
be digitally reproduced without error.2 82 Counsel and judges who are fa-
miliar with the rule and its contents rarely have reason to litigate it at trial.
278. See United States v. Hope, No. 07-60769, 2008 WL 4491466, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 8, 2008)
(holding that, unlike drug samples, firearms are easily identified because they bear serial numbers). See
also Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 32 F. Supp.2d. 47, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that "[every] handgun is
marked with the manufacturer's name and unique serial number [so that] once [a] gun is located, the
identification of the manufacturer can be [determined] and even [if] the gun itself cannot be located,
each [gun] leaves a [distinct] 'fingerprint' or 'track' on the discharged bullet which can be identified
through various ballistics tests.").
279. For an interesting discussion of the evidentiary and Sixth Amendment considerations in using
a chain of custody see United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). The court in Oates rejected the
government's attempt to prove a chain of custody in a drug case by using hearsay evidence. Although
Oates represented the minority position at that time, the Supreme Court's holding in Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36 may ultimately change that result.
280. FED. R. Evio. 1002. Requirement of Original.
281. FED. R. EVID. 1001, Advisory Committee's Note:
In an earlier day, when discovery and other related procedures were strictly limited, the mis-
leading names "best evidence rule" afforded substantial guarantees against inaccuracies and
fraud by its insistence upon production of original documents. The great enlargement of the
scope of discovery and related procedures in recent times has measurably reduced the need
for the rule. Nevertheless important areas of usefulness persist: discovery of documents
outside the jurisdiction may require substantial outlay of time and money; the unanticipated
document may not practicably be discoverable; criminal cases have built-in limitations on
discovery.
Edward W. Clearly & John W. Strong, The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in Context, 51 Iowa L.
Rev. 825 (1966).
282. FED. R. EVID. 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates.
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Rule 1002 and its exceptions are expansive in facilitating the drafter's in-
tent for greater admissibility.2 3 Areas where litigation may occur are
caused when the original and all duplicates have been destroyed and the
proponent attempts to prove the contents of a writing with oral testimony
or a hand written copy. 284
Because best evidence issues are so infrequently raised at trial not
spend much time is spent on them here or during the semester. Post Craw-
ford285 and Daubert,286 evidence class is so crammed with significant devel-
opments and issues that some areas simply need to be shortened or
excluded. While I still cover Article X, it is an abbreviated discussion. In-
cluded in that discussion are examples designed to help students see the
rules parameters. Those examples are also set out in Category A and
demonstrate that conceptually the place to start class conversation is by
identifying when the requirement for an original document does not even
apply.287 Interestingly, once students master that idea, the remainder of
this rule and Article X are much easier to understand.
D. Category D: Rules 403, 404, 405, 412-415, 608, 609 -
The "Tipping Point" Rules - Who to Believe?
Category D addresses character and credibility evidence. Viewed in
its broadest sense, this area injects humanity into the calculus of litigation
because it deals primarily with the participants' personalities and histories.
283. See United States v. Hampton, 464 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding, in federal bank
robbery trial, that copies of important documents were admissible unless there was a genuine question
about their authenticity or the authenticity of the originals, and that defense counsel's hypothesis as to
inadmissibility was so improbable that no reasonable person would accept it).
284. See Mark D. Robins, Evidence at the Electronic Frontier: Introducing E-mail at Trial in Com-
mercial Litigation, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 219, 245-46 (2003) (discussing that contro-
versy occasionally arises under the best evidence rule when neither an original nor a duplicate is
available and the proponent seeks to introduce other secondary evidence of the contents of the docu-
ment, although courts in the past have not allowed witnesses to testify regarding their observations
about the destroyed document or record). See also United States v. Wells, 262 F.3d 455, 459. 463 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court erred by allowing the government to admit oral testimony of a
cooperating witness "concerning his memory of the contents of previously destroyed ledgers that pur-
portedly contained information regarding amounts of drugs he and his friend .. . sold to [one of the
defendants]," because the testimony was inadmissible hearsay).
285. 541 U.S. 36.
286. 509 U.S. 579.
287. See Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2006)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant in a patent licensing case, the court held that the Best
Evidence Rule is inapplicable unless a witness is actually testifying about the document in question and
its contents).
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Issues like truthfulness,2 88 honesty,28 9 past criminal conduct, 290 sexual pre-
disposition291 propensities for sexual offenses,2 92 bias,293 community repu-
tations and individual personal opinions about a witness's character,294
among others are all in play here.
Character and credibility rules generally have little to do with the
events causing trial. They have everything to do with the kind of person
the parties or witnesses are and ultimately what, if any, weight the fact
finders will give their testimony. Sometimes this evidence is admissible
even when the witness or participant does not testify.295 As discussed gen-
erally in Category A, these rules are often the tipping point in a close case.
They provide the background information necessary for jurors to decide
who is telling the truth and who to find for, as a result.
An easy example involves distinguishing character evidence used to
prove "truthfulness" 296 from character evidence used to prove "hon-
esty." 297 While the untrained ear may hear these two concepts as being the
same, and the untrained mind may apply them interchangeably, they re-
present two entirely different areas of evidence law and possess signifi-
cantly different criteria for admission and use.
Category D rules also have different and interesting legislative histo-
ries. Some were the subject of very heated congressional debate 2 98 while
288. See FED. R. EVID. 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness.
289. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a). Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Excep-
tions; Other Crimes.
290. See FED. R. EVID. 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime.
291. See FED. R. EVID. 412. Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past Sexual Be-
havior or Alleged Sexual Predisposition.
292. See FED. R. EVID. 413. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases; FED. R. EVID.
414. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases; FED. R. Evio. 415. Evidence of Similar
Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual Assault or Child Molestation.
293. Although not specified in the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 608(b) has been interpreted as
permitting evidence of a witness's bias. In United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2008), the
court discussed this connection, relying on Supreme Court guidance. In United States v. Abel, 469 U.S.
45, 52, 56 (1984), the Court held that "it would be a strange rule of law which held that relevant,
competent evidence which tended to show bias on the part of a witness was nonetheless inadmissible
.... ." The Court went on to say that "proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder
of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear
on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony." Further, in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17
(1974), the Court held that "the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and impor-
tant function of the constitutionally protected right to cross examination."
294. See FED. R. EvID. 405. Methods of Proving Character.
295. FED. R. EvID. 404(a) permits the accused to introduce evidence concerning a pertinent char-
acter trait even if he chooses not to testify. Under these circumstances, the government is then permit-
ted to respond. See United States v. Gaertner, 705 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
defendant presenting positive character evidence opens the door to the government introducing nega-
tive character evidence).
296. FED. R. EvID. 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness.
297. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Character evidence generally.
298. See FED. R. EvID. 609, Advisory Committee Notes, Jan. 2, 1975, P.L. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat.
1935 (Mar. 2, 1987).
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others had virtually no congressional debate but were significantly criti-
cized by other sources. 299 The reasons are as varied as the rules them-
selves. Politics, social and cultural issues as well as legal and pedagogical
ones played a large role determining ultimate composition.
Category D's goal is for students to see that a litigator's job only be-
gins with telling the story of what happened. She must also be prepared,
when appropriate, to effectively personify the participants in a way that
allows jurors to appreciate who they are, what they did, why they did it and
ultimately who to believe. Character and credibility evidence may well be
the Rosetta Stone for interpreting trial testimony.
1. Rule of General Applicability
a. Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time
Before looking at the substantive rules students are reminded to incor-
porate our Category A, Rule 403 discussion here. Character and credibility
issues are ripe with Rule 403 possibilities. Experienced litigators are al-
ways mindful that simply because a quantum of evidence qualifies for ad-
mission does not mean that it will reach the jury. Upon timely objection,
the proponent will usually be required to establish that admitting this evi-
dence will not violate any of Rule 403's prohibitions. Because character
and credibility evidence has such an inherent emotional component, the
possibility for it to unfairly inflame the jury's passions is often present. The
discussion of each rule below makes that point.
2. Rules that Deal with Character Evidence
a. Rule 404(a). Character Evidence Generally - Criminal Trials
Only
The Federal Rules of Evidence often begin by explaining what cannot
be done, then go on at length to provide how to do it.300 Such is the case
with character evidence. As a general matter, it is not admissible in crimi-
nal or civil trials.3 0 ' This means parties are not permitted to prove that
299. See Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the Admission of Character
Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases, submitted to Congress on Feb. 9, 1995, in accordance
with § 320935(c) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 329035(c) of Act
Sept. 13, 1994, P.L. 103-322.
300. FED. R. EvIa 802, makes the general statement that hearsay is not admissible. Every other
rule in Article III explains how to admit it.
301. The leading case in this area is Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). Writing for
the Court, Justice Jackson explained:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow re-
sort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a
probability of his guilt. Not that the law invests the defendant with a presumption of good
character.. . but it simply closes the whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on
the prosecution's case-in-chief. The State may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law,
specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically
be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not
rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the
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because an individual has a certain kind of personality or disposition he
acted in conformity with that personality or disposition on a specific date or
under specific circumstances.3 0 2 The common law is much more concerned
with proving a party's or witness's actions than in establishing his character
traits.303
Rule 404(a) is different.304 It allows an accused to present evidence
concerning a pertinent character trait of his or of the alleged victim's.
Neither the accused nor the alleged victim need testify for this evidence to
be admissible. However, only the accused may initiate it. The government
may respond in kind after the accused has opened the door.30 5
This provision becomes much clearer to students when presented with
an example. The accused is charged with assault. He defends on self-de-
fense. Whether he takes the stand or not, defense counsel may present
reputation or opinion evidence indicating that the accused is a peaceful
person and/or that the victim is a hostile person. After such evidence has
been presented, the government can offer contrary proof, that the accused
is a hostile person and that the victim is a peaceful person.3 0 6 The philoso-
phy at play here and the one that defense counsel, for example, will argue
to the jury is that, because the accused demonstrated that he is a peaceful
person the jury should use that proof and find that on the day and time in
question the accused acted in conformity with his pertinent character trait
which means he did not assault the victim, and in fact acted only in self-
defense.
b. Rule 405(a). Methods of Proving Character - Criminal Trials
Only
The portraits and mosaics regime allows students to see that when
Rule 404(a)(1) and (a)(2) evidence is introduced, Rule 405(a) requires such
jury and to so over persuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him
a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding
such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disal-
lowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.
Id. at 475-76.
302. For our purposes here, character evidence can be admitted for two reasons. First, where
character is an issue in the case - this occurs when a person's character becomes an element of a claim,
charge or defense. That aspect of the rule will be covered later in the semester when more time can be
allotted to it. For our Category D overview purposes, we focus only on the second purpose for using
character evidence - when a party is offering it as circumstantial proof of conduct at a specific time
and in a specific place.
303. See FED. R. EVID. 412-415, which together deal with the admissibility of similar acts of mis-
conduct when offered in child sexual molestation and sexual assault cases whether criminal or civil.
304. FED.R.EVID. 404(a). Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove Conduct; Exceptions;
Other Crimes.
305. See United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding in this drug
prosecution that although the government is permitted to question the accused's character, it must wait
until after the accused has placed his character in issue).
306. This scenario was discussed in United States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2000), where the
accused offered evidence of the victim's violent character. The court added that such testimony is
admissible as long as it is reputation or opinion evidence, not specific instances of conduct proof. and
comports with Rule 405. Id.
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proof be in the form of reputation or opinion testimony.o7 Interestingly,
neither rule defines those terms.30 s
Reputation evidence can be explained as information a witnesses
knows about an individual's pertinent character trait from having heard
community conversation about him3 09 Opinion evidence is based on a wit-
ness's personal knowledge of the individual's pertinent character trait310 In
both circumstances the factual predicate for the attack must concern the
accused or the alleged victim themselves. Information about family reputa-
tions for instances would be inadmissible.x
Rule 405(a) also allows reputation and opinion character witnesses to
be cross-examined with specific instances of conduct evidence.312 While
not specified in the rule, practice requires that this cross-examination be
conducted in a specific way. Reputation witnesses must be asked "have
you heard questions," and opinion witnesses asked "do you know ques-
tions." 313 Again, an example helps clarify. I ask student to look at the fact
pattern we discussed in Rule 404(a) above. Based on that testimony, the
defense character witness is cross-examined by the prosecutor. Assuming
the prosecutor has a good faith belief in the basis for his question, he asks
the defense opinion witness, "Do you know that the accused was recently
arrested for assaulting his girlfriend?"3 14 If a reputation witness testified,
the prosecutor under the same circumstance would ask, "Have you heard
that the accused was arrested for assaulting his girlfriend?" These ques-
tions are designed to test the witness's knowledge of the accused's
character.
307. FED. R. EVID. 405. Methods of Proving Character.
308. In Govt. of the Virgin Islands v. Petersen, 553 F.2d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 1997), a case decided
shortly after the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, the court provided this very interesting
insight into opinion and reputation evidence: "[T]estimony in the form of an opinion is now admissible
to prove a relevant character trait . . . the rule reflects the reality that reputation evidence has been
largely opinion in disguise."
309. Two issues are presented here which are beyond the scope of our overview. The first is that
hearsay obviously plays a large role in such testimony. See FED. R. EvID. 803(19) - (21) (providing
exceptions). Similarly, questions arise concerning how "community" is defined. In United States v.
Oliver, 492 F.2d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 1974), the court held that community may be the place where one
lives or works.
310. For an excellent discussion of the foundational requirements for admitting reputation and
opinion evidence, and how the Federal Rules of Evidence treatment differs from the common law see
United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1382 (11th Cir.1982).
311. See United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 19 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding no error in excluding character
witness's testimony which was based on knowledge of the family, not the accused).
312. See United States v. Monteleone, 77 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that specific act must
be relevant to testing the pertinent character trait in issue).
313. See United States v. Franklin, 471 F.2d 1299, 1301 (5th Cir. 1973) (referring to Michelson v.
United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), the court discussed the appropriate use of impeachment questions).
314. See United States v. Adair, 951 F.2d 316, 319 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that government must
have a good faith factual predicate for the incident).
315. Specific instances of conduct when used to test character witnesses under Rules 404(a) and
405(a) should not be confused with specific instances of conduct evidence admissible under Rule
405(b). The specific conduct evidence would be admissible to prove an individual's character trait if
that character trait was an essential element of a claim, charge, or defense. While Rule 405(b) is an
important aspect of character evidence, it is not covered in the overview as a concession to time
limitations.
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3. Rules that Deal with Character Evidence in Sex Offenses
a. Rule 412. Sex offense Cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past
Sexual Behavior or Alleged Sexual Disposition
Unlike the provisions addressed in Category C, Congress created Rule
412 to reduce the amount of admissible evidence, but only as it applies to
testimony concerning rape and other sexual offense victims.316 The Privacy
Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, was intend to encourage victims
of sex related offenses to report such conduct by excluding character and
other evidence used primarily to attack the victims' self-esteem and invade
their privacy." The rule excludes evidence of the alleged victim's sexual
character and predisposition as well as past sexual behavior.18 It applies in
both criminal and civil cases involving all forms of alleged sexual miscon-
duct. For Category D purposes, the regime's overview concentrates on the
character evidence component of the provision, realizing that Rule 412 also
addresses the victim's sexual activity background.
Rule 412's impact on sex offense litigation has been immense. 319 At
common law rape prosecutions were actually bifurcated proceedings. The
government tried the accused for the charged sexual offense, and the de-
fense tried the victim for lacking morality and encouraging both the
charged sexual activity and promiscuity. 320  Rule 412 ended that practice.
Unless defense counsel can demonstrate that negative character evidence
qualifies for admission under one of the exceptions contained in Rule
316. Without Rule 412, the admission character evidence against victims of sexual misconduct
would be controlled by the much more liberal Rule 405(a). This provision would permit admission in
most circumstances where Rule 412 excludes it. Further, evidence which might be admissible against
the victim pursuant to Rules 404(a), 404(b), 406, 607, 608 and 609 is preempted by Rule 412
considerations.
317. In United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1991), the court held that "the avowed
purposes of the rule . .. [is] 'to protect rape victims from the degrading and embarrassing disclosure of
intimate details about their private lives' . .. , to encourage reporting of sexual assaults, and to prevent
wasting time on distractive collateral and irrelevant matters."
318. FED. R. EvID. 412(a). Evidence generally inadmissible.
319. Rule 412's impact on Federal and State criminal litigation is well documented. See Ann Alt-
house, Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape Shield Rules Matter? 25 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 757 (1992)
(discussing the effectiveness of rape shield laws on protecting victims). Its impact on civil litigation has
also been significant. For example, in hostile work environment sexual harassment suits, it has pro-
vided guidelines for determining what evidence is admissible and for what purpose. Leigh A. Salmon,
Note, "Whoever Fights Monsters Should See to it that in the Process He Does Not Become a Monster":
The Necessity of Maintaining and Narrowing the Welcomeness Requirement in Sexual Harassment Suits,
77 IND. L.J. 615, 622 (2002). Rule 412's impacted on civil discovery has significantly affected the man-
ner in which discovery is conducted. Maria-Teresa Garcia, Note, The Amended Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 412 Provides Some Relief to Victims of Harassment, 19 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 267, 271-72 (1998)
(although defendants in sexual harassment cases still request that courts compel plaintiffs to answer
interrogatories regarding their sexual history and personal life, judges have applied Rule 412 in a man-
ner that upholds Congress' intent).
320. Rule 412 represents an overdue attempt to rectify a serious and persistent defect in the com-
mon law as it overturned the long-standing defense practice in rapes cases of attempting to show con-
sent by showing the victim's predisposition to have sex. Paul F. Kirgis, A Legisprudential Analysis of
Evidence Codification: Why Most Rules of Evidence Should Not Be Codified - - But Privilege Law
Should Be, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 809, 852 (2004).
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412(b), testimony about the alleged victim's sex life, morality, life style,
past sexual conduct or sexual habits is prohibited.321
Rule 412(b)(1) contains three exceptions to these general prohibitions:
(1) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the victim offered
to show that someone else was the source of semen, injury or other physical
evidence;3 22 (2) evidence of past sexual activity between the accused and
the victim in order to show consent; 323 (3) evidence which if excluded
would violate the accused's constitutional rights. 24 Character evidence is
not specifically mentioned in any of the enumerated exceptions, and is po-
tentially admissible only if defense counsel can demonstrate that it is con-
stitutionally required under Rule 412(b)(1)(C). 3 25  This generally means
the challenged proof is vital to the accused's affirmative defense.326
For example, the accused's reasonable mistake of fact defense is based
on his knowledge of the victim's sexual reputation for promiscuity, her flir-
tatious behavior leading up to the charged offense, and information friends
have told him about the victim's similar previous behavior before she had
sex with them. All of this information is potentially inadmissible based on
Rule 412(a), and can be admitted only if it falls within one of Rule
412(b)(1)'s exceptions. The tension between Rule 412 and the accused's
constitutional rights to raise a defense is not capable of being formulaically
resolved and is well beyond the reach of our regime overview. Resolution
requires balancing sensitivity to the policy issues underlying Rule 412, and
a case by case determination based on the available proof.327
321. In United States v. Hitt, 463 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2006), the court held that character impeaching
evidence was properly excluded because some of the assumptions it was based on were inaccurate, the
evidence was only marginally relevant, and defendant had other opportunities to impeach. See United
States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1983) (demonstrating how expansive Rule 412 exclusion-
ary provisions are, court held defense counsel was properly prohibited from introducing evidence indi-
cating alleged victim's child was born out of wedlock).
322. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A).
323. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B).
324. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C).
325. Defense counsel's analysis here often begins with Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973) (finding Sixth Amendment violation where accused prohibited from offering important defense
evidence). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (reversing conviction because defense prohib-
ited from thoroughly cross-examining key government witness); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975) (holding Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a defense in criminal proceedings); California
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (holding that, read together, Constitutional provisions require an
effective defense); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (rejecting per se rule excluding hypnotically
refreshed testimony as violating accused's right to confront accusers).
326. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (permitting rape defendant to offer testimony
indicating victim was living with another man, to help establish bias defense).
327. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991) (stating that rape shield laws are viewed as a valid
legislative decision that sexual offense victims required additional privacy protections).
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b. Rules 413, 414, 415. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual
Assault and Child Molestation Cases, and Evidence of
Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual
Assault and Child Molestation
Although it may be counterintuitive at first, one of the first things stu-
dents learn about these provisions is that in many ways they are logical
extensions of Rule 412 and the rape shield philosophy. Rules 413 to 415
were designed to increase the amount of character evidence admissible
against an accused sexual offender just as Rule 412 was designed to limit
the amount of such evidence admitted against the alleged victim of a sexual
offense. When viewed together, these rules have the net effect of signifi-
cantly facilitating the prosecution's case while severely limiting the de-
fense's case. This is the precise result Congress intended.328
Later in the semester we will spend a great deal of time discussing
Rules 413 - 415 and juxtaposing them against their Rule 404(a) and (b),
and Rule 405 character evidence counterparts, as well as against Rule 412,
their substantive evidentiary law counterpart. 329 However, at this point in
our overview such coverage would be inappropriately complex.3 o Our
goal here is to familiarize students with the Violent Crime Control and
Enforcement Act of 1994, and its liberalizing treatment of character evi-
dence when used against those accused of criminal and civil sexual assault
or child molestation.331
328. Congress adopted FED. R. EVID. 412, The Rape Shield Law, in 1978. See Robert P. Mostel-
ler, Evidence History, the New Trace Evidence, and Rumblings in the Future of Proof, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 523, 527 (2006). In 1995, Congress adopted Rules 413-415, over the objection of the Judicial
Conference and the Evidence Advisory committee. The new rules admit defendant's propensity evi-
dence shown through past criminal sexual acts. Id.
329. Rules 413-415 create three exceptions to Rule 404(a)'s ban on the use of character evidence:
(1) they allow the use of character evidence in prosecutions in which the accused is charged
with sexual assault or child molestation and [(2)] in civil cases in which the victim seeks com-
pensation for having been sexually assaulted or molested . . . [and (3)] authorize the use of
evidence of the defendant's commission of other sexual assaults or molestations to prove any
relevant matter, including the defendant's propensity to commit the offense charged.
Miguel A. Mendez, Relevance: Definition and Limitations - - Conforming the California Evidence Code
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 329, 350-51 (2007). Moreover, these rules codify an
"exception to Rule 404(b) by allowing evidence of an accused's other sex offenses to be admitted to
show his propensity to commit that type of crime." Joyce R. Lombardi, Comment, Because Sex Crimes
are Different: Why Maryland Should (Carefully) Adopt the Contested Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and
414 that Permit Propensity Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Other Sex Crimes, 34 U. BALT. L. REV.
103, 114 (2004). Similarly, although not specific instances of conduct as set forth in Rule 405, Rule 413-
415 permit the use of evidence of specific prior instances of conduct expressly permitted by those rules.
Peter Nicolas, "They Say He's Gay": The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual Orientation, 37 GA. L.
REV. 793, 808 (2003).
330. These rules could also have been included in our Category C discussion about increasing the
amount of admissible proof.
331. See § 329035, Violent Crimes Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Public Law No. 103-
322 (1994).
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Congress created these rules to overcome the perceived limitations im-
posed by Rules 404(a)(b) and 405 in admitting evidence concerning an ac-
cused's past sexual acts and propensity for involvement in such conduct.33 2
Congresswoman Susan Molinari, the provisions' primary sponsor, stated on
the Congressional Record that federal courts "must liberally construe"
these rules so that juries will be in a better position to accurately evaluate a
criminal or civil defendant's responsibility based on his character, propen-
sity, and past behavior.3 33
While Rules 413 and 414 accomplish that goal, they have very limited
and specific applications. Rule 413 provides that when an accused is
charged with a sexual assault, evidence of the accused's previous "sexual
assault[s] is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any mat-
ter to which it is relevant." In child molestation cases, Rule 414 provides
that evidence of previous "child molestation[s] is admissible, and may be
considered "for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."3 34 In a
civil context, Rule 415 accomplishes the same result. It is difficult to overes-
timate the impact these rules have had on sex and child molestation prose-
cutions.3 35 They have revamped the way character evidence and prior
related sexual misconduct can be used in those cases.
An example easily makes the point. Consistent with Rule 414, when
an accused is charged with child sexual molestation, prosecutors are now
permitted to introduce evidence of the accused's previous similar acts, and
then during closing argue to the jury that because the accused has been
involved in previous acts of child molestation, he has the propensity to
commit such crimes and that in fact, on the day and time in question, the
accused, acting in conformity with his criminal propensities and past acts,
committed the charges offense. Students should be reminded here that
Rule 404(b) specifically prohibits using evidence of past acts to show a
criminal propensity.336
332. See "Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the Admission of Character
Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases," Feb. 1995, criticizing Rules 413 and 414 because they
would facilitate convictions for sexual assault and child molestation based on the accused's past crimi-
nal record and alleged propensity to commit such crimes and not on the available proof. The Judicial
Conference desired to reject these provisions in favor of modifying Rules 404(a) and 405.
333. See the floor statement of Congresswoman Susan Molinary, "Prior Crimes Evidence Rules
for Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Cases (Cong. Rec. H8992-92, August 21, 1994).
334. Rule 415's provisions apply to civil cases in which sexual assault and child molestation claims
for damages or other relief are made.
335. In United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2007), the court held that the trial judge
had not abused his discretion by admitting defendant's prior conviction for attempted rape of a child.
This court found that the similarity between the past offense, attempted rape of a 12 year-old and the
current charge, traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct
with a 12 year-old, was striking and admissible under Rule 414 for the purpose of establishing propen-
sity to commit other sexual offenses. Id.
336. See United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006) (reversing a conviction in a child
pornography case because similar acts evidence was improperly admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b)
against the accused because it simply demonstrated the accused's predisposition or tendency to commit
the charged crime).
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As might be expected, these rules have been the subject of numerous
constitutional challenges. To date all categorical challenges have been un-
successful largely because appellate courts interpret Rule 403 as providing
sufficient protection against abuse. 3  When used in combination, Rules
413-415 and Rule 403 give the trial judge sufficient discretion to ensure that
convictions are based on a factual record and not simply "bad man" emo-
tional evidence.338 Some courts have stated that without Rule 403, the con-
stitutionality of these rules would be in doubt.33 9
Students should come away from this discussion understanding that
evidence concerning an accused's or victim's pertinent character traits is
generally inadmissible. Rule 404(a) provides exceptions that apply to all
criminal cases concerning the accused's or victim's pertinent character
traits. Similarly Rule 412(b)(1)(c) provides the bases for admitting charac-
ter evidence against a sexual assault victim when it is constitutionally re-
quired. Finally, Rules 412-415 allow prior sexual assault or child
molestation acts to be used for establishing that the accused has a propen-
sity to commit such acts.
337. In United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005), the court examined the use and consti-
tutionality of Rules 413 and 414:
Based on the special treatment that Rule 413 accords to prior sexual assault offenses in prose-
cutions charging a defendant with sexual assault, [the accused] suggests that the rule deprives
him of equal protection of the law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment .. . (citation omitted). However, Rule 413 implicates neither a fundamental right nor a
suspect class ... (citation omitted). Consequently, the more sweeping rule of admissibility that
the rule creates for a defendant's prior acts in cases involving sexual assault does not violate
equal protection principles so long as the rule has a rational basis (citation omitted). As the
legislative history reveals, Congress enacted Rule 413 because sexual assault cases, especially
cases involving victims who are juveniles, often raise unique questions regarding the credibility
of the victims which render a defendant's prior conduct especially probative . . . (citation
omitted). Its reasoning in this regard cannot be described as irrational (citation omitted).
Id. at 487. See also United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting equal protec-
tion challenge to Rule 414); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433-34 (10th Cir. 1998) (under
plain error review, rejecting equal protection challenge to Rule 413); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d
1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting due process challenge to Rule 414).
338. The brief legislative history of Rules 413-415 indicate that Rule 403 was intended to be a
critical gauge in determining whether and how previous incidents could be used. See 140 Cong. Rec.
S12990-01 (Sept. 20, 1994) (statement by Sen. Bob Dole indicating Congress's intention that Rule 403
be used to exclude evidence which would be unfairly prejudicial to the accused). See also 140 Cong.
Rec. H8968-01 (August 21, 1994) (Congresswoman Molinari stated that Rules 413-415 were drafted
with the intention of excluding the covered evidence when it violated Rule 403).
339. In United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998), the accused appealed from a
rape conviction alleging that evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 413 violated his due process and equal
protection rights. Affirming the accused's conviction the court held that, although Rule 413 raises
serious constitutional issues including threatening to convict simply because the accused appears to be a
bad man and not because he committed the charged offense, Rule 403 eliminates the constitutional
infirmity. Id. The court stated that "without the safeguards embodies in Rule 403, we would hold [the
rule] to be unconstitutional." Id.
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4. Rules that Deal with Credibility Evidence: Who to Believe
a. Rule 608 - Opinion and Reputation Evidence and Specific
Instances of Conduct Evidence Concerning Truthfulness -
Criminal and Civil Trials
Students now have a significant appreciation for the thematic interre-
lationships between the individual rules of evidence and their systemic ap-
plications. Here in Category D, where proof of character and credibility are
our focus, we now examine the essence of how hotly contested trials are
decided, that is, which witnesses will the jury believe and how much weight
will the jury give their testimony?
Experienced litigators know that simply proving the elements of their
party's case will often not be enough to succeed at trial. This is largely
because well-tried cases present two different but compelling views of the
same events. Facially, each side's story may have merit and each side's
witnesses may appear to be credible. But in order to win at trial, the jury
will have to decide which party's witness are the most believable. That a
determination will invariably lead to which party succeeds. 340
Rule 608 is an important vehicle in this equation.341 It provides that
simply by testifying, a witness places her credibility in evidence.34 2 This rule
contains the tools for challenging and establishing a witness's veracity.
Subparagraph (a) provides that credibility can be tested by reputation or
opinion character evidence,343 and subparagraph (b) provides that specific
instance of conduct can be used for the same purpose.344
Using Rules 608(a) and (b) requires that both the proponent and the
opponent adhere to specific timing requirements. While details of this pro-
cess are beyond the scope of our discussion, it is important students at least
hear the requirements now: (1) In order for Rule 608 to apply the witness
must testify thereby placing her credibility in issue. (2) The party calling
this witness cannot immediately after the witness testifies "bolsters" her
testimony by calling another witness who will present laudable character
for truthfulness proof. (3) Rule 608 requires that negative evidence con-
cerning credibility must first be presented by opposing counsel. (4) Only
340. See Chnapkova v. Koh, 985 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1993) (when used with Rules 403and 608(b),
credibility evidence admitted under Rule 608(a) is crucial to resolving credibility issues and should have
been admitted against plaintiff).
341. FED. R. EvID. 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness.
342. Pursuant to FED. R. EvID. 608, after a witness testifies her credibility can be attacked and
then supported but only with evidence that deals with credibility. In United States v. Anderson, 139
F.3d 291 (1st Cir. 1998), the court held that proof the witness engaged in prostitution and related sexual
illegalities was not relevant to her character for veracity and thus not admissible under this provision.
343. See United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding it was error
to exclude opinion evidence to impeach a government witness's credibility); Deary v. City of Glouces-
ter, 9 F.3d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding it is proper to cross-examine concerning reputation for
truthfulness).
344. See United States v. Williams, 464 F.3d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that the district court
did not err in excluding proof of a witness's prior commission of murder, because in those specific
instances of conduct were not sufficiently probative of the witness's character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness).
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after such an attack has been made, may the witness's proponent "rehabili-
tated" her credibility with positive character evidence.34 5
A couple of examples will help students understand the process. First,
concerning Rule 608(a), after a proper foundation is established, an opin-
ion witness may testify that in his opinion the witness who has previously
testified is not believable, or a reputation witness my testify that the previ-
ous witness's testimony in her community for truthfulness in not good.346
Similarly, Rule 608(b) provides that after the witness testifies, opposing
counsel may question her about previous specific acts reflecting negatively
on her credibility347 Both Rule 608(a) and (b) say that after the witness has
been attacked, the proponent my rehabilitate his witness. 348 This can be
done by calling reputation and opinion witnesses to positively testify about
credibility.34 9
Finally, it should be mentioned that Rule 403 often plays a major role
in determining the admissibility of credibility evidence.35 0 While such
proof is clearly relevant under Rule 401, its tendency to confuse, mislead or
play to the jury's emotions may lead to unfair prejudice and the needless
consumption of time.351
b. Rule 609 - Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
Rule 609 concerns admitting evidence of a witness's past conviction as
a way of impeaching that witness's credibility and thus her testimony.352 It
can only be used after a witness testifies and then only to show that a wit-
ness who has been convicted of a crime is less likely to tell the truth than a
345. For an excellent discussion of the correct timing processes for using credibility evidence see
KENNETH S. BROUN, ROBERT P. MOSTELLER, PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EVIDENCE, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS, 624-25 (6th ed. 2002).
346. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing both opinion and repu-
tation evidence).
347. See United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that cross-examiner
must be in possession of sufficient proof to support the general belief that the witness committed the
specific act in question).
348. It is not always easy to determine when there has been an attack. Clearly negative reputation
and opinion evidence is an attack. Similarly, proving specific instances of untruthfulness is also an
attack. However, Rule 608(a)'s last sentence indicates that there are other events justifying rehabilita-
tion. The drafter's use of the word "otherwise" here has been interpreted as meaning., for instance,
that scathing cross examination challenging the witness's credibility can justifying rehabilitation. See,
e.g., United States v. Angelini, 678 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing standards for admitting rehabili-
tation evidence after slashing cross-examination). Alternatively, evidence of contradiction or inconsis-
tencies will generally not be a sufficient basis for rehabilitation. See United States v. Danehy, 680 F.2d
1311 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that prosecutor's thorough use of inconsistencies and contradictions were
an insufficient basis for rehabilitation).
349. See United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that "evidence of
a witness's [character for truthfulness] is admissible only after his character for truthfulness has been
attacked" and holding that the prosecution's pointing out inconsistencies in the defendant's testimony
and arguing that the testimony was not credible did constitute such an attack and thus did not open the
door to allow the defendant to call witnesses to testify positively about the defendant's credibility).
350. See United States v. Dakins, 872 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (using Rule 403 to justify the
admission of credibility evidence).
351. See Williams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that the ad-
missibility of credibility evidence is limited by Rule 403's protections).
352. FED. R. EVID. 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime.
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witness who has not been convicted.s' The rule is applicable to both civil
and criminal trials, and to all witnesses including the accused.354
This is a highly controversial provision.'" It has been significantly re-
vised over the years in hopes of minimizing the conflict.3 56 Part of this
disagreement centers on the great possibility that once a jury learns that
the accused has been convicted of a previous crime, they will most likely
vote to convict. Disagreement about the rule's efficacy also concerns
applying its criminal basis to civil actions.
Two types of convictions are admissible: felonies irrespective of the
crime as long as the prescribed punishment exceeds one year,3 5 9 and crimen
falsi convictions - those crimes where an element of the offense involves
dishonesty or a false statement irrespective of the sentence.36 o Crimes that
are more than ten years old measured from the date of conviction or the
353. The Advisory Committee explained the philosophical basis for the rule as being "a demon-
strated instance of willingness to engage in conduct in disregard of accepted patterns is translated into
willingness to give false testimony." 45 F.R.D. 161, 297.
354. In Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 707 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1983), the primary issue in this tort
case was whether error occurred when the trial judge allowed a key defense witness to be cross-ex-
amined concerning his prior multi-count, felony drug conviction. Appellant aircraft company alleged
among other issues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing cross examination. Id. The
court rejected defendant's argument and found no reversible error. Id.
355. The long standing debate on using evidence of previous convictions for "crimes-at-large" to
impeach credibility is well and thoroughly discussed in Ladd, Credibility Tests - Current Trends, 89 U.
PA. L. REv. 166, 177-78 (1940).
356. For example, in 2003, the Advisory Committee on Federal Evidence Rules sought to amend
Rule 609(a)(2) in order to resolve a circuit split on the standards for admitting crimes involving dishon-
esty or false statement. The conflict centered on automatically admitting only those crimen falsi convic-
tion that are especially probative as opposed to all that meet Rule 609(a)(2)'s statutory elements
defining admissible crimes as those which involve an act of dishonesty or false statement. See George
Edward Spencer, Comment, Interpreting the New Rule 609(A)(2), 57 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 717, 719-
720 (2007). The Committee eventually decided that "automatically admissible crimes [would include]
those [in which] it readily can be determined that the elements of the crime, as proved or admitted,
required an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness." Id. at 721. The new version of the rule
went into effect in 2006. Id. at 717.
357. "The current version of Rule 609 provides that evidence showing a criminal defendant has
been convicted of prior crimes is generally admissible to attack the defendant's credibility when he or
she testifies." Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with FRE Rule 609: A Look at How Jurors Really
Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 23 N.C. CENT. L.J. 14, 14 (1997).
358. In Wilson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 56 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 1995), the court
examined whether in a civil action for work related injuries, excluding plaintiff's previous drug convic-
tion, was appropriate. Affirming the trial court decision, the Tenth Circuit held:
During the liability phase of the trial, Union Pacific was not permitted to introduce evidence
of [plaintiff's] drug conviction in order to impeach his credibility as a witness . .. Evidence of a
conviction for drug possession alone is not highly relevant to the issue of veracity (citation
omitted). Moreover, such evidence can be highly prejudicial and arouse jury sentiment
against a party-witness (citation omitted). Given the substantial deference accorded to the
trial court in balancing these factors (citation omitted), we find no error in the court's exclu-
sion of evidence relating to [plaintiffs] drug conviction.
Id.
359. See United States v. Del Toro Soto, 676 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that defendant in
theft of mail case was properly impeached with evidence of previous grand larceny and drug possession
convictions).
360. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). See also United States v. Harper, 514 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2008)
(admitting misdemeanor conviction for theft-by-check under this provision because element of the
crime involved an act of dishonesty).
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date of release from confinement, whichever is later, are generally inadmis-
sible but may be admitted if the proponent establishes that admission
serves the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction
outweighs is prejudicial effect, and that the proponent provide the adverse
party with notice that the issue will be contested.6 '
Again, an example of how the rule can be used is helpful. In a crimi-
nal case the accused is charged with bank robbery. Evidence of his previ-
ous conviction for bank robbery will likely be admissible against him if he
testifies. Alternatively, if the accused does not testify, thereby not placing
his credibility in issue, the conviction could not be admitted on these facts.
This choice about testifying and placing the accused's character in issue, or
not, is a difficult one for defense counsel. Keeping his client off the stand to
avoid impeachment may significantly weaken the defense's case. Placing
his client on the stand and allowing the jury to hear that he has already
been convicted of a bank robbery risks conviction based on the "bad man"
theory - the jury will think, certainly someone who has previously robbed a
bank is more likely to commit another bank robbery than someone who
has not robbed a bank.362
The class conversation at this point is likely to be animated and expan-
sive. Rule 609 requires students to distinguish between the substantive facts
of the case and the role credibility evidence plays in determining who the
jury will believe and ultimately whether the accused will be convicted. It
also acts as a wonderful summary for our portraits and mosaics regime dis-
cussion. When the rule was amended in 1990, the drafters incorporated a
Rule 403 balancing test. The test has two standards, one for the accused
and one for everyone else. As might be expected, the one for the accused
makes admission more difficult than the one for everyone else 36 3
In this way, Rule 609 has its own mosaic built in. It requires students
to balance the substantive requirements of Rule 609 against the substantive
requirements of Rule 403 in determining whether this otherwise relevant
361. See FED. R. EVID. 609(b); United States v. Watler, 461 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006) (measuring
ten year time limit from the date of conviction or release to the date subsequent trial begins; error to
measure from date of release from confinement to date of indictment on subsequent charge).
362. In United States v. Headbird, 461 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir. 2006), the court dealt with this
issue in classic Rule 609 context:
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Headbird's prior convic-
tions for impeachment purposes . .. Credibility was a key factor in the jury's consideration of
the case. Defense and government witnesses presented contradictory testimony regarding pos-
session of the firearm, and possession was the only contested element of the offense.
Headbird's prior convictions were highly probative of his credibility "because of the common
sense proposition that one who has transgressed society's norms by committing a felony is less
likely than most to be deterred from lying under oath."
363. See Advisory Committee Note accompanying the changes to subdivision (a), effective De-
cember 1, 1990.
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evidence should reach the jury. If the evidence is admitted, defense coun-
sel must then consider Rule 105 in determining whether the "benefits" of a
limiting instruction would be appropriate 364
III. CONCLUSION
Rule 609 is an excellent way to end the portraits and mosaic regime
overview. This provision's controversial nature encourages students to con-
sider both sides of the "fairness" debate, thus helping them develop an
appreciation for how the rules of evidence often have an outcome determi-
native effect on the trial.
Rule 609 also requires students to deal with the complexities of Rule
403's balancing issues which have been built into the provision. Finally,
students will have to integrate Rule 105's instructional issues into their
evaluation of whether to call a witness whose testimony will be impeached
with very damaging evidence that will likely spill over into other areas of
the litigation.
The complexity and number of difficult legal and practical human de-
cisions which must be made when Rule 609 is used highlight the overarch-
ing value of the portraits and mosaics regime introduction. The rules are
meant to be considered and applied together. They contain thematically
consistent mosaics which make identifying, understanding and properly
utilizing the rules easier and more effective. Introducing these mosaics
during the first week of class assists students in understanding how to use
both the individual rules, the combined portraits they create, and the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence in general.
364. An excellent example of the trial tactical considerations explored by the portraits and mosa-
ics regime's approach to Rule 609 is contained in United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d 1449, 1453 (D.C. Cir
1995), vacated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1164 (1996). There the court held that:
As we have recently noted, "Rule 105 clearly places upon defense counsel the burden of re-
questing an instruction limiting the use to which the jury may put [such] evidence . . . " United
States v. Brawner, 308 U.S. App. D.C. 212, 32 F.3d 602, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Indeed, we have
explained that there are occasions when, for tactical reasons, defense counsel may wish to
forego such a limiting instruction because it might focus the jury's attention on the damaging
evidence (citation omitted). Here, once [defense] counsel failed in his effort to exclude [key
government witnes.'s testimony], he may well have elected to dispense with a limiting instruc-
tion in order to avoid highlighting the evidence.
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